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 Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: A Global Analysis 
Yusheng Cen 
 
In this thesis, I analyze the roles of different institutional investors and how they affect firm 
performance based on a global dataset of 31 countries (regions) from 2007 to 2016. Breaking down 
institutions by geographic information (domestic or foreign) and type (such as mutual fund or 
pension funds), I first find that all institutions share preference for large firms, firms that 
experienced negative stock returns, and firms with lower leverage and high liquidity. I also find 
that various types of institutional investors affect firms’ operating performance differently. The 
relation is convex for foreign institutions, while the opposite is true for domestic institutions. This 
indicates that foreign institutional investors exert better corporate governance when ownership is 
high, while domestic institutions are subject to business ties with firms when they hold substantial 
amounts of voting rights. Further analysis reveals a U-shaped relationship between firms’ 
operating performance and the ownership level of investment advisors/bank trusts/pension funds, 
indicating a monitoring effect with high levels of ownership. However, mutual funds exhibit a 
concave influence on firm value, signifying negative impact of business ties when ownership is 
high. The findings for other types of institutions (hedge fund and insurance companies) are 
inconclusive.  
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Institutional investors play an increasingly important role worldwide, primarily due to 
globalization. There is also a tremendous increase in the aggregate level of institutional ownership 
during the past years. According to the World Bank, institutions hold nearly $100 trillion worth of 
assets under management (AUM) in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries in 2013. McKinsey & Company reports an AUM of $88.5 trillion held by North 
American asset management companies as of the end of 2017. As one of the largest investment 
management corporation, BlackRock reported a total of $6.84 trillion AUM in its 2019 second 
quarter financial statement. 
Institutional investors are becoming increasingly dominant in many countries (Gillan and 
Stark, 2003), not only in developed nations, but also in emerging markets (Khorana, Servaes, and 
Tufano, 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Institutional investors are frequently recognized as a 
mechanism for corporate governance, either by actively interfering with management decisions 
(Gillan and Stark, 2003) or indirectly “voting with feet” (Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Admati 
and Pfleiderer, 2006). In this study, I examine what attracts these institutional investors and how 
they engage in shareholder-value maximization. Not all institutions, by geographic origin or type, 
share the same incentive or cost of monitoring. I focus on two groups of institutions for comparison: 
foreign and domestic, and independent and “grey”1.  
 
1 Independent institutions are composed of mutual funds, investment advisors, and hedge funds. Grey institutions 
include bank trusts, insurance companies, and pension funds (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). 
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Notably, a significant feature of globalization is the increasing inflow of foreign 
institutional investment (FII), which provides advantages, such as lower cost of capital (Bekaert 
and Harvey, 2000), improvements and efficiency in capital markets (MBA Knowledge Base, 2010). 
The influence of foreign institutional investors has been increasing worldwide. For example, 
sovereign wealth funds have been found to invest in profitable and financially stable foreign listed 
firms for increased portfolio diversification (Mietzner, Schiereck, and Schweizer, 2015). Elliott 
Management Corp., an aggressive US-based hedge fund, was associated with 22 activist 
campaigns in eight different foreign countries in 2018 (2018 Review of Shareholder Activism, 
2019). Mietzner and Schweizer (2011) find that new institutional investments (hedge funds and 
private equity) not only bring positive abnormal returns to target firms but also have intra-industry 
effects on rival firms in Germany. Foreign institutional investors are also argued to be beneficial 
for firms in several ways, such as in helping improve firm performance (Gillan and Starks, 2003; 
Ferreira and Matos, 2008), enhancing corporate governance (Ferreira, Massa, and Matos, 2010), 
reducing information asymmetry (Jiang and Kim, 2004), and facilitating cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (Ferreira, Massa, and Matos, 2010). Meanwhile, independent institutions, such as 
mutual funds and investment advisors, are also found to hold a more active attitude toward 
management, while grey institution, such as bank trusts and insurance companies, are not (Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith, 1988; Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). 
However, there is only a small group of researchers who focus on the monitoring role of 
institutional ownership worldwide. Most studies put heavy emphasis on the US equity market 
(such as Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005). Therefore, I present a detailed exploration of 
corporate governance outside the United States. Moreover, previous literature only examines the 
monotonic relation between institutional ownership and firm performance. Academic research has 
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already proven that there is a non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership (Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) / CEO ownership (Kim and Lu, 2011) / largest insider ownership 
(Basu, Paeglis, and Toffanin, 2017) and firm valuation. Thus, this study investigates whether there 
is also a non-linear relation between institutional ownership and firm performance. Empirical 
evidence suggests that shareholders would only actively participate in corporate governance when 
they hold a substantial amount of shares, while small shareholders tend to be free-riders since the 
cost of monitoring outweighs the benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 
1988; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Gillan and Starks, 2003). Others argue that certain types of 
institutions with high shareholdings would align with management because of business relations 
(Davis and Kim, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Therefore, it is still unclear which of these 
effects dominate. To better understand the role these institutional investors play in the global equity 
market, especially foreign institutional investors, I focus on non-U.S. firms from 31 nations.2 
I first follow Ferreira and Matos (2008) to analyze what firm-level and country-level 
characteristics attract institutional investors. Overall, I find that these investors target large firms, 
firms incorporated in countries with better disclosure qualities, and countries with English as an 
official language. However, after the financial crisis, institutional investors have been observed to 
place greater value on firms with higher liquidity and lower leverage. These two characteristics 
happen to be at the core of the 2008 financial crisis: liquidity and credit risks. 
Using a sample of non-U.S. firms listed in 31 countries from 2007 to 20163, I find the 
relation between (total) institutional ownership and firm performance to be convex, suggesting 
 
2 I excluded U.S. firms because they are dominant in the dataset. Including U.S. firms would bias the results toward 
institutional investors’ role in the United States. Moreover, unlike in other countries, firms listed in the United States 
are mainly held by domestic institutional investors.  




that the “free-rider” problem would compromise corporate governance when ownership is low. 
The positive influence appears beyond a certain level of shareholding. By controlling for the level 
of ownership concentration, other firm-level, and country-level characteristics, I find a similar 
relation between foreign institutional ownership and firm performance, and a contrary result for 
domestic institutional investors.  
Previous analyses argue that independent institutions, such as mutual funds and investment 
advisors, are “more likely to collect information, confront less regulatory and legal restrictions on 
their investments” (Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005), or are “less subject to management 
influence” (Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988). On the contrary, grey institutions such as bank 
trusts and insurance companies are “potentially passive” (Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005), 
“pressure-sensitive,” or “frequently derive benefits from business relations,” as suggested by 
Brickley et al. (1988), and are detrimental to firm performance (Ferreira and Matos; 2008). Both 
categories, due to heterogeneity, seem to be ill-suited here. Therefore, I further break down 
(ungroup) these institutions by their type. I find that investment advisors, bank trusts, and pension 
funds exhibit clear convex relations with performance. Contrariwise, mutual funds present a 
concave pattern. Unfortunately, I do not find a significant influence on valuation from hedge funds 
or insurance companies. 
One primary concern in this study is the endogeneity problem: highly valued firms could 
also attract institutions. This causality problem is especially real regarding foreign institutional 
investors. Because of different barriers, foreign institutions tend to avoid investing in firms with 
high information asymmetry (Jiang and Kim, 2004) or in countries with low legal protection (La 
Porta et al., 1998). I address this problem by reestimating all models with simultaneous regression, 
specifically, a three-stage least square (3SLS) regression. The results remain robust for the 
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institutions on which I find unambiguous effects (foreign and domestic institutions, mutual funds, 
investment advisors, bank trusts, and pension funds). These results are also robust when I: 1) 
substitute country-fixed effects for country-level control variables, and 2) use Fama–MacBeth 
regression. 
I contribute to previous debates on the role of different institutional investors by: 1) 
analyzing the non-linear relation between institutional ownership and firm performance, thus 
revealing the trade-off among different effects (business ties, free-rider, and monitoring) and 2) 
integrating the impact from each type of institution to better understand the heterogeneity. My 
study, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to provide a quadratic relation between institutional 
ownership and firm performance, especially on an international basis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces previous literature; 
Section 3 provides an overview of the data; Section 4 explains the hypotheses; Section 5 discusses 
the methodology and empirical results, mainly focusing on the analysis of the relations between 
institutional ownership and firm performance and also presents the robustness checks and 
alternative model (dynamic model); and Section 6 provides the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
 
 Most of previous research shows that institutional investors can be an effective mechanism 
for corporate governance. The main reasons are: 1) institutional investors often hold more 
resources and incur fewer costs, compared with individual investors, or are more “professional” 
(Barclay and Holderness, 1988); they could accumulate shares to vote against the management 
group for the interest of shareholders (“active monitoring”) and 2) even if institutional investors 
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do not engage in direct governance, they could potentially “threaten” managers by selling shares, 
bringing downward pressure on the firm’s stock price (“voting with feet” or “exit”) (Brown and 
Brooke, 1993; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009). Gillan and Starks (2003) suggest that institutional 
investors could also reveal information that is not easily obtained by individual investors. Chung, 
Firth, and Kim (2002) argue that managers could manipulate profit to gain opportunistic earnings 
through discretionary accruals. Chung and Wang (2014) propose a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and leverage, suggesting institutions as an alternative to debt-holders with 
regard to monitoring. The following segments provide support for institutional investor 
governance from three channels: sizeable institutional ownership, foreign institutional investors, 
and “independent” institutions. Institutional ownership has also been found to have an association 
with better disclosure, liquidity, and less information asymmetry (Boone and White, 2015). 
2.1 Large Institutional Ownership 
 
 Although generally, institutional shareholders are considered to provide better corporate 
governance, many researchers state that small institutions do not have much incentive for corporate 
governance due to “free-rider” problems. Regardless of different institution types, Gillan and 
Starks (2003) point out that when the shareholding is low, institutions are less likely to monitor 
the behaviors of managers or CEOs as they would bear the entire cost of monitoring, while all 
other shareholders benefit. The more diffused the ownership structure is the fewer incentive 
investors have to monitor management. Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find evidence of 
corporate governance from large shareholders. They highlight that even if large shareholders do 
not engage in monitoring, they could initiate a third-party takeover. They also argue that large 
shareholders could prompt better-expected profit from the pre-monitoring purchase of shares. 
7 
 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) point out that a more concentrated institutional ownership structure 
could increase managers’ sensitivity of pay-for-performance practices and reduce the overall level 
of compensation. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a theoretical survey of corporate governance. 
They suggest three alternative corporate governance mechanisms other than insider management: 
large shareholders, takeovers, and large creditors. Franks and Mayer (1994) also find some 
“indirect” evidence when studying German firms. They indicate that concentrated ownership 
structures are prevalent in the Continental European capital market. They also find evidence in 
Germany that poor corporate performance is associated with board turnover. Furthermore, they 
argue that the control benefits in Germany are less secured compared with those from the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Similarly, in Japan, Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and 
Shivdasani (1995) provide the view that this “monitoring and disciplinary role” is attributable to 
banks and other corporate shareholders, who are usually associated with high management 
turnover after poor performance, which in turn reduces agency costs and aligns management’s 
incentives with those of shareholders (posting restrictions on management’s entrenchment 
activities).  
However, there also exist some problems with large shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) point out that one primary concern is that large shareholders may only care about their own 
interests, especially when their control rights are superior to cash flow rights, thus expropriating 
other stakeholders in the firm, such as employees, other minority shareholders, and sometimes 
even managers. They also suggest that there might be large institutions that are rich enough such 
that they seek for control rather than benefits. Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010) indicate that there 
is a co-movement between institutional ownership and financial misreporting. However, they point 
8 
 
out that the likelihood of misreporting is offset by the level of concentration. Their conclusion 
indirectly supports the “free-rider” concern. 
Therefore, it is yet unclear whether large shareholders do have a positive impact on firm 
performance on a global basis, and whether this positive effect is monotonic.  
2.2 Foreign and Domestic Institutional Investors 
 
Foreign investors nowadays play a vital role in equity markets, especially in emerging 
markets (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira, Massa, and Matos, 2010). 
Many studies reveal that foreign institutional investors have a robust disciplinary and monitoring 
effect on management groups or insider ownership. They usually affect governance through direct 
involvement or indirect supply-demand structures (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Jiang and Kim (2004), 
with evidence from the Japanese market, propose that there is an inverse relationship between 
information asymmetry and international investors. Ferreira and Matos (2008), based on 2000–
2005 data from 27 countries, state that on a global basis, foreign institutional investors enhance 
firm valuation, while domestic institutions do the opposite. 
Similarly, using a sample from 23 emerging markets, Loncan (2018) find that foreign 
institutional ownership reduces the overall cash balance but increases the proportion of cash that 
is attributable to firm valuation. Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) also find (based on 
2003–2008 data from 23 countries) a connection between better corporate governance and foreign 
institutional ownership outside the United States. Further analysis from Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
reveals that foreign institutional ownership increases the likelihood of an independent board 
structure, yet domestic institutions have no such relation. The authors also state that institutions 
from common-law countries prompt better governance than those from civil-law countries. Deng, 
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Li, and Li (2018) analyze firms from 39 countries and conclude that foreign institutional investors 
reduce stock liquidity commonality, through which they can improve firm valuation. The authors 
also find direct evidence that foreign institutional investors are associated with better corporate 
transparency and information quality. Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010) study mergers and 
acquisition activities and find that foreign institutions facilitate cross-border M&A by reducing 
bargaining costs and information gap between bidders and target firms. 
Meanwhile, other researchers oppose the above views by stating that foreign institutional 
investors are associated with information asymmetry and more considerable monitoring costs, 
which are mainly triggered by cultural differences, geographic distance, different legal systems, 
and restrictions on activities (La Porta et al., 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Kang and Kim, 2010; 
Deng, Li, and Li, 2018). For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that managers can apply a 
variety of defenses against corporate shareholders, especially foreign investors. They give an 
example wherein Russian domestic investors are only required 25% ownership to assume control, 
while Western investors are required 75% ownership. Similar constraints are also seen in Thailand 
(Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994) and South Korea (Jiang and Kim, 2004). From another perspective, 
Kang and Kim (2010) find that foreign institutions, who share the same language and similar 
cultures, are more likely to participate in governance ex-ante mergers and acquisitions.  
On the contrary, domestic institutions suffer less from information asymmetry, but they 
usually have more business relations with the firm they invest in, are more likely to share the 
benefits of control, and are less “willingly” to vote against the incumbent management group 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010; Bena et al., 2017). In 
particular, Aggarwal et al. (2011) use the phrase “more loyal to management” when referring to 
domestic institutional ownerships. 
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Overall, a high level of ownership by foreign institutions seems to generate better firm 
performance due to fewer business relations. However, they are more susceptible to the free-rider 
problem. Domestic institutional investors are the exact opposite: they suffer less from information 
asymmetry but are more likely to be compromised by business ties when they hold a substantial 
number of voting rights. 
2.3 “Independent” and “Grey” Institutions 
 
Even though large or foreign institutional investors facilitate good corporate governance, 
not all types of institutions are efficient in doing so. Several researchers (such as Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008) suggest that the costs related to governance vary across 
different types of institutions. By analyzing the votes on anti-takeover amendments, Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith (1988) find that institutional investors and outside blockholders tend to vote 
more actively than non-blockholders. The authors also conclude that mutual funds, endowments, 
foundations, and public pension funds are more likely to oppose management decisions than banks, 
insurance companies, and trusts, which are institutions that usually have more business relations 
with the firm. Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) extend the research of Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) and conclude that the positive connection between pay-for-performance practices and 
ownership of institutional investors is associated with the concentration of active investors. They 
also suggest a negative relation between pay-for-performance practices and cost of monitoring and 
a negative association between ownership concentration (regardless of type) and level of executive 
compensation. Ferreira and Matos (2008) categorize institutions by their type into “independent” 
(mutual funds and investment advisors) and grey (banks, insurance companies, and others). They 
argue that independent institutions have a positive impact on firm performance, while grey 
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institutions have a negative effect. Independent institutions, as they suggest, also promote better 
operation performance and reduce managers’ capital expenditure. De-la-Hoz and Pombo (2016) 
find a similar positive influence from independent institutions and a negative impact from grey 
institutions by studying firms from six Latin American countries. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) 
focus on U.S. M&As and find that independent and long-term institutions can improve “three-year 
buy-and-hold post-merger abnormal returns (BHARs), the post-merger change in industry-
adjusted return on assets (ΔROA), and post-merger changes in analyst earnings forecasts (ΔEPS).” 
These institutions are also more likely to withdraw from bad deals instead of selling shares, while 
grey institutions do not have such power. 
Nevertheless, the roles of different institutional investors seem to contradict. Interestingly, 
the above authors do not even have a universal definition of “independent” and “grey” institutions. 
For example, Ferreira and Matos (2008) categorize pension funds as “pressure-sensitive” 
institutions, while Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), and Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) 
instead suggest that public pension funds tend to be “active” on corporate issues. Cremers and Nair 
(2005) state that public pension funds are usually neutral with regard to corporate pressure and 
conflicts of interest and are thus active shareholders. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) use pension 
fund ownership as an alternative corporate governance indicator (substitute for blockholders). 
Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2010) study Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUKFF)’s activism, 
which is a U.K. pension fund, and find that the intervention brings about positive outcomes. By 
contrast, Wahal (1996) finds no significant results (as measured by stock return and accounting 
performance) when studying activism from nine public pension funds in the United States. A 
recent study conducted by Sonza and Granzotto (2018) also finds no monitoring role of pension 
funds in the Brazilian capital market. Instead of analyzing outcomes from activism, Jiao and Ye 
12 
 
(2013) examine the level of pension funds’ ownership and firm performance. They find an 
inverted-U shaped relation, indicating that there exists a dynamic trade-off between “effective 
monitoring” and “public interest.” 
Moreover, Davis and Kim (2007) also state that public pension funds are less correlated 
with conflicts of interest and are therefore, more active on corporate governance. They also find 
evidence that several large mutual fund companies generate profits from corporate benefit plans 
and conclude that mutual funds that have more business ties with respective companies tend to be 
more reluctant to vote against management. Mutual funds have been considered many times as 
“passive” investors. Indeed, unlike hedge funds, which actively benefit from mergers and 
acquisitions, most mutual funds are index-trackers. However, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) 
proved that although mutual funds are considered “passive investors,” they are not “passive 
owners.” They find that increased ownership of mutual funds is associated with greater board 
independence, more opposition on anti-takeover protection and staggered board structure. 
Hedge funds are probably the institutional investors that engage the most in activities of 
shareholder activism. Numerous studies prove a positive abnormal return around the date of hedge 
fund activism, and this positive return usually persists (Klein and Zur, 2009; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, 
and Thomas, 2008; Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 2015; Denes, Karpoff, and McWilliams, 2016). 
Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) also find a positive abnormal announcement return for German 
firms after a hedge fund has acquired at least 5% of shares. However, this positive return does not 
hold for the long term. Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2017) find similar results in a global 
analysis, although the level of announcement return varies across regions (with Japan as an 
exception). Jory, Ngo, and Susnjara (2017) find evidence of wealth transfer from bond returns to 
stock returns. Meanwhile, Cremers, Masconale, and Sepe (2016) argue that the incremental effects 
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of risk-taking after hedge fund activism is not in line with management incentive and thus, is 
detrimental for firms’ long-term performance. Recently, deHaan, Larcker, and McClure (2019) 
express doubt on previous studies and propose two drawbacks of past methodologies: 1) 
researchers focus only on equal-weighted abnormal returns, and several rare cases might drive the 
results; and 2) studies that focus on firms’ long-term operating performance ex-post do not take 
into consideration ex-ante performance. They scrutinize 1,455 target firms and find that the 
smallest tier of firms biases the “positive” short-term abnormal return. Further analysis reveals no 
significant improvement of accounting-based operating performance or any significant post-event 
long-term value-weighted stock return. 
Bank ownership is probably related to the most controversial opinions. Zemzem, Guesmi, 
and Ftouhi (2017) study 86 non-financial firms listed in the Euronext 100 index and find a positive 
impact from banks, either as creditors or shareholders. Others document that bank ownership could 
improve firms’ liquidity by facilitating access to bank loans (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Lin, 
Zhang, and Zhu., 2009), for instance, in terms of lower cost of capital (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
As previously mentioned, Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find support 
for governance from bank directors in Japan. Oppositely, also in the Japanese market, Morck and 
Nakamura (1999) conclude that dual responsibility (as both creditors and shareholders) diminishes 
banks’ incentives for value-maximization. Qian and Yeung (2015) also find that in China, relations 
with banks render firms less in need of equity markets. These firms thus face fewer restrictions 
from the equity market and are usually associated with deteriorated corporate governance. 
However, Petersen and Rajan (2009) and Qian and Yeung (2015) focus more on the creditor role 
of banks instead of the shareholder. 
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Overall, independent institutions seem to have a positive impact on firm performance and 
grey institutions have a negative one. However, there is no clear conclusion from the previous 
contradictory studies. There seems to be more heterogeneity among different types of institutions 
that requires further scrutiny. 
3. Hypotheses  
 
Previous literature only focuses on the monotonic relation between institutional ownership 
and firm performance. However, researchers have already introduced a non-linear relation between 
ownership and firm performance. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) developed the 
piecewise regression and found a non-monotonic impact from managerial ownership. Basu, 
Paeglis, and Toffanin (2017) find a convex relation between the largest individual ownership and 
firm performance. Kim and Lu (2011) suggest that at a low level of (CEO) ownership, CEOs’ 
incentive alignment effect dominates. However, beyond a certain level of shareholding, CEOs tend 
to pursue non-pecuniary benefits at the cost of firm performance.  
As mentioned above, institutional investors are more active in corporate governance than 
individual investors since they hold more resources and possess better knowledge of the equity 
market (Barclay and Holderness, 1988). However, when institutional ownership is low, these 
investors are less willing to monitor management’s performance since they would bear all the 
monitoring costs, while all investors benefit (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Meanwhile, large 
institutional shareholders generate less marginal monitoring costs, have more voting powers, and 
are more willing and more effective in terms of monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Thus, I expect that when institutional ownership is 
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low, institutional investors are compromised by the “free-rider” problem, thereby negatively 
affecting firm performance. When the ownership level is high, they actively participate in the 
monitoring, and the positive effect dominates. Based on these assumptions, I develop the first 
hypothesis on total (average) institutional ownership: 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance is 
convex. 
 Foreign institutional investors, due to cultural difference, geographic distance, different 
legal systems, and restrictions on activities (La Porta et al., 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Kang 
and Kim, 2010; Deng, Li, and Li, 2018), usually encounter higher monitoring costs due to more 
severe information asymmetry. Thus, foreign institutional investors, as compared with average (of 
the total) institutional investors, would encounter more “free-rider” problems since they are less 
willing to take an active stand. Instead, they would remain “passive” and be detrimental to other 
shareholders. However, investors that hold a substantial level of ownership have the ability and 
incentive to monitor, as large shareholders are found to be active on corporate governance issues 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Moreover, it is 
well-known that foreign institutional investors are beneficial for firm performance in several ways 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira, Massa, and Matos, 2010), in terms 
of reducing information asymmetry (Jiang and Kim, 2004), cutting excessive cash expenditure 
(Loncan, 2018), generating a more independent board structure (Aggarwal et al., 2011), and 
lowering stock commonality (Deng, Li, and Li, 2018). Foreign institutions are also suggested to 
have fewer business relations with local firms (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
Taken together, large foreign institutional investors are deemed to be more effective (than average 
institutional investors) on corporate governance and able to prompt better firm performance. 
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Therefore, I anticipate foreign institutional ownership to exhibit a similar (convex) pattern on firm 
performance as total institutional ownership does, while the inflection point would be higher 
(flatter U-shape), since investors with low ownership would be more reluctant to monitor. 
Meanwhile, domestic institutional investors face less monitoring costs because they share 
the same culture, have better knowledge of policies, and are more familiar with the business. 
Nonetheless, these investors might have more business ties with the firm they invest in and share 
the benefits of control (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010; 
Bena et al., 2017). Therefore, when ownership is not too high, domestic institutional ownership 
would have a positive effect. When ownership is beyond a certain level, due to stronger business 
ties, they tend to form a coalition with management in ways that harm minority shareholders. 
Based on the assumptions above, I present the second hypothesis on foreign and domestic 
institutional investors: 
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between foreign institutional ownership and firm 
performance is convex. 
Hypothesis 2b: The ownership–value structure is concave for domestic institutional 
investors. 
The effects from a breakdown by institution type (independent and grey) would be less 
precise than that by geography. There is not much literature related to grouping different types of 
institutions, especially on a global basis. Independent institutions (mutual funds and investment 
advisors), which researchers suggest to have a positive effect on firm value (Ferreira and Matos, 
2008; De-la-Hoz and Pombo, 2016), are more likely to oppose management decisions (Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith, 1988), prompt higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (Almazan, Hartzell, and 
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Starks, 2005), and improve accounting-based and stock performance (Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). 
However, there are reasons to suspect that independent institutional ownership is not always 
positively correlated to firm performance. When ownership is low, independent institutional 
investors, though credited to be active, could remain passive to “free-ride” from the monitoring of 
other shareholders. Therefore, I also expect a convex relation between independent institutional 
ownership and firm performance. Specifically, when ownership is low, independent institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with firm performance due to the “free-rider” problem; when 
ownership increases beyond a certain threshold, the relation becomes positive due to active and 
effective monitoring.  
Grey institutions, as suggested, are detrimental to firm performance (Brickley, Lease, and 
Smith, 1988; Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). However, it is 
debatable whether pension funds “actively monitor” or are “passively pressure-sensitive.” Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith (1988) and Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) instead suggest that public 
pension funds tend to be “active” on corporate issues, while Ferreira and Matos (2008) classify 
group pension funds into grey institutions. Since Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) and Almazan, 
Hartzell, and Starks (2005) only focus on U.S. firms, the study of Ferreira and Matos (2008) are 
comparably the latest, and the database I use is built by Ferreira and Matos (2008); thus, I also 
consider pension funds as “grey.” Moreover, I expect that grey institutions would harm firm 
performance. When ownership is high, grey institutions, as suggested (e.g., by Ferreira and Matos, 
2008), would be less likely to oppose management decisions due to higher monitoring costs or 
business ties. When ownership is low, there is no reason to anticipate better corporate governance 
from them. On the contrary, due to the free-rider problem, they would be less willing to monitor. 
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Thus, the effect from low grey institutional ownership is also expected to be harmful or utterly 
insignificant. 
Based on the assumptions above, I propose the following: 
Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between firm performance and independent institutions is 
convex. 
Hypothesis 3b: Grey institutional ownership is negatively related to firm performance. 
4. Data Description 
4.1 Institutional Ownership Data 
 
I collect all institutional holdings data from FactSet Ownership (LionShares) via Wharton 
Research Data Services. FactSet database is a leading provider of equity and fixed-income 
information for global institutional and non-institutional investors. FactSet (LionShares) collects 
stock-holding information from different sources, such as 13F filings from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), regulatory authorities from different countries (for example, 
SEDAR system for Canadian firms), or sometimes directly from annual financial statements and 
local mutual fund associations (the majority of the European and Asian funds). “The FactSet 
Ownership database (LionShares) contains global equity ownership data for approximately 13,000 
institutions, 33,000 unique mutual fund portfolios, and 280,000 non-institutional 
insider/stakeholders with history going back to 1999.”4  
 





The FactSet stock ownership summary database (from WRDS) is provided quarterly by 
Ferreira and Matos (2008), which contains the ownership of ordinary shares, preferred shares, 
American depositary receipts (ADRs), global depositary receipts (GDRs), and dual listings 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008). I collect data from 2007 to 2016, which is the maximum available 
period due to limitations from some control variables (which I explain in the next section). The 
ownership data are matched on the calendar date of each firm’s fiscal year-end. For firms that have 
a fiscal year-end different from any quarter-end, I match the equity holding to the closest quarter 
end before the fiscal year-end. For example, for a firm whose fiscal year-end is in May, 
institutional ownership information is matched in March (first quarter). Total institutional 
ownership (IO_TOTAL) is defined as the total institutional ownership as a percentage of the market 
capitalization of a firm at the end of each (calendar month of) fiscal year. I also incorporate the 
quadratic form of institutional ownership square (IO_TOTAL2), which is total institutional 
ownership (IO_TOTAL) squared, as explained in the hypotheses section. 
Following Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal et al. (2011), I first break down total 
institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL) by geographic characteristics. I define domestic institutional 
ownership (IO_DOMESTIC) as the sum of the holdings of institutions (that are domiciled in the 
same country as where the stock is issued) as a percentage of market capitalization. Similarly, 
foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOREIGN) is the international portion of total institutional 
ownership (IO_TOTAL) and equals total holdings of foreign institutions in a firm’s stock divided 
by market capitalization. I also split foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOREIGN) into two sub-
portions: U.S. foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOREIGN_US) if the foreign institution is 
incorporated in the United States and non-U.S. institutions (IO_FOREIGN_NUS) otherwise. 
Figure 1 in the appendix demonstrates the total institutional ownership as a percentage of total 
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market capitalization (IO_TOTAL) for each country in my sample, with a breakdown into domestic 
institutional ownership (IO_DOMESTIC) and foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOREIGN). By 
the end of 2016, the United States and Ireland are the two countries associated with the highest 
total institutional ownership, at 74% and 72%, respectively. While in the United States, most 
institutional investors are domestic with 85% domiciled in the same country, Ireland has nearly all 
its investors from another country. For most of the countries, foreign institutional investors 
dominate in terms of firm ownership. Canada and Sweden relatively have the highest percentage 
of domestic institutions (both around 54% of total ownership). Figure 2 in the appendix depicts 
the trend of institutional ownership for five well-known countries: the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany. We can see an increasing trend of ownership from foreign 
institutional investors. In the United Kingdom, foreign institutional ownership has increased from 
19% in 2007 to 28% to 2016. Even in the United States, where domestic institutional investors 
own the majority of shareholdings, foreign institutional ownership almost doubled from 2007 to 
2016. 
Furthermore, I follow Ferreira and Matos (2008); Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005); 
and Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) and divide the institutions into “independent” and “grey” 
institutions. However, there is a disagreement among these authors. As explained in the previous 
section, Ferreira and Matos (2008) categorize pension funds as “pressure-sensitive” institutions 
and group them under “grey” institutions, while Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) and Almazan, 
Hartzell, and Starks (2005) argue that pension funds participate actively in daily governance. Since 
the database is constructed by Ferreira and Matos (2008) and their study is comparably the most 
recent, I also consider pension funds as passive institutions. Figure 3 in the appendix illustrates the 
same institutional ownership information by all countries as in Figure 1, with the breakdown by 
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type of institutional investor. We can see from Figure 3 that a large proportion of institutional 
holding is related to mutual funds and investment advisors. Among all the countries, bank trusts 
and insurance companies demonstrate extremely low shareholding. 
4.2 Firm and Country Level Control Variables 
 
First, I use the Herfindahl index as a measure of ownership concentration, which is from 
the same database I collect the institutional ownership data. The higher the index is, the less the 
dispersion of institutions. I incorporate the concentration ratio to control for the free-rider problem 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2003). A total institutional ownership of 30% held 
by one large investor would generate a different monitoring effect compared with the same level 
of ownership held by ten investors. 
Next, I obtain most of the other firm-level control variables from Compustat – Capital IQ. 
There are two sub-databases in Compustat: Compustat North America and Compustat Global. The 
former contains only firms that are listed in the United States, Canada, or Mexico; the latter 
provides data of firms listed in the rest of the countries. Since financial statement data and stock 
price data in Compustat are based on the currency of the country where the firm is located, I convert 
all the currency to U.S. dollars according to the foreign exchange rate obtained from the Federal 
Reserve H10 report. For each observation, I match the exchange rate on the last business day of 
the month to the calendar month of the respective firm’s fiscal year-end. I acquire the MSCI All 
Country World Index (ACWI) list from the iShare website, which is presented by BlackRock. One 
challenge here is identifying companies that are cross-listed (ADR) on the U.S. stock exchange. I 
use two different methods to determine which firms are cross-listed. Firms with an ADR ratio in 
Compustat (North America) or firms that are incorporated both in Compustat (North America) and 
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Compustat (Global) are considered cross-listed (ADR) companies. All firm-level control variables 
(except dummy variables) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimize the noise by 
outliers. 
Furthermore, I follow Ferreira and Matos (2008) by incorporating country-level control 
variables to substitute for country-fixed effects. I manually collect the firms’ legal information 
based on anti-director rights and the rule of law index from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1998) 5 . Disclosure strength and GDP per capita data are from the Global 
Competitiveness Reports. However, the 2006 report is not available anywhere. Therefore, the 
sample period starts from 2007. I obtain market capitalization to GDP information from CEIC 
Data6 and official language information from CIA World Factbook7. Table A1 in the appendix 
presents a more detailed explanation of all variables and the sources from which they are obtained. 
I match firm-level control variables to institutional ownership data based on several 
identifiers: ISIN and SEDOL (Compustat Global firms, whichever is available), CUSIP 
(Compustat North American firms), and GVKEY (in case other identifiers are missing). I exclude 
all utility and financial firms (SIC 4900−4999 and SIC 6000−6999) due to different regulations 
and financial statement formats. The final sample includes 14,527 non-U.S. firms across 31 
different countries (regions) from 2007 to 2016. Table 1 provides the summary statistics for all 
variables. Total institutional ownership, on average, is 11.5%, 6.3% foreign and 5.2% domestic. 
 
5 The anti-director rights index (ADRI), which was first introduced by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), is doubted by several studies.  Spamann (2010) re-examine the legal data and offer a correction for 
thirty-three of the forty-six countries of the original ADRI. There are also alternatives, such as the anti-self-dealing 
index, which are suggested to work better than the original ADRI (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Sheleifer, 
2008; Spamann, 2010). In this thesis, I mainly use the legal information as a country level control variable. Thus, the 
improved legal data does not necessarily improve or change the outcomes of the regressions. Moreover, as we will 
see in the robustness test section, I substitute the country dummy variables for country-level control variables and 
obtained similar results. 
6 CEIC Data (from https://www.ceicdata.com/en) 
7 From https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/402.html  
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Investment advisors hold comparably the highest shares (average 7.8%); while bank trusts barely 
invest in companies as shareholders (with a maximum of only 8.2%). Moreover, among the sample, 
3.4% of the observations are members of the MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI); 49.4% do 
not have research and development (R&D) data available; 3.3% are cross-listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange; and nearly one-third are from countries where English is (one of) the official language(s). 
  
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Determinants of Institutional Ownership 
 
I begin by re-examining Ferreira and Matos’ (2008) model on what characteristics attracts 
different types of institutional investors worldwide. The regression framework is shown in the 
following equation: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 =  𝛼 +  ∑ 𝛽
𝑖






The next two subsections present the analysis broken down by geography and institution types. 
5.1.1 Determinants of Foreign and Domestic Institutions 
 
Table 2 demonstrates the determinants of total institutional ownership, as well as the 
breakdown by foreign (further broken down between U.S. and non-U.S.) and domestic institutions. 
The results indicate that foreign and domestic institutions share some preferences on the stock they 
invest in. Consistent with Ferreira and Matos (2008), SIZE is the most significant attribute that 
attracts all institutional investors. Moreover, both domestic and foreign institutional investors are 
prone to investing in firms with lower annual return (RET), higher share turnover (TURN), and 
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lower leverage (LEV); firms located in countries (regions) with better disclosure (DISC) and 
shorter average distance to other markets (DISTANCE); and countries (regions) whose official 
language(s) includes English (ENGLISH), those with higher GDP per capita (GDP), and those 
with lower market capitalization as a percentage of GDP (MCAP). One significant discrepancy 
between my results and Ferreira and Matos’ (2008) is that all institutional investors have stronger 
preference for lower leverage (LEV) and higher share turnover (TURN), which are credit and 
liquidity measures. One probable reason is that Ferreira and Matos (2008) use a sample from 2001 
to 2005, which is before the 2008 financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis is mainly associated 
with credit and liquidity crises. Thus, it is reasonable for institutions after the financial crisis to put 
more emphasis on firms with better liquidity (higher share turnover) and lower debt (lower 
leverage). 
Notwithstanding the homogeneity, foreign and domestic institutional investors differ in 
many ways. Even U.S. and non-U.S. foreign institutions differ. Similar to what Ferreira and Matos 
(2008) find, domestic institutional investors favor firms that pay higher dividends (DY), while 
foreign institutions avoid these firms. Foreign investors (both U.S. and non-U.S.) have strong 
preference for firms that are members of the MSCI ACWI and that are cross-listed on the U.S. 
stock exchange, while domestic institutions demonstrate an opposite pattern (with negative 
coefficients for the MSCI and ADR dummy variables). Although all institutions are in favor of 
firms listed in English-speaking countries, U.S. foreign institutional investors show stronger 
preference compared with non-U.S. institutional investors. U.S. foreign institutions are also biased 
toward value stocks (with higher book-to-market ratio), while domestic institutions present a 
contradictory preference. Non-U.S. foreign institutions seem to be indifferent with regard to firms’ 
book-to-market ratio. One interesting finding is that both types of foreign institutions do not favor 
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stocks listed in countries (regions) with strong legal protection, while the opposite is true for 
domestic institutional investors. This finding contradicts that of La Porta et al. (1998), while 
consistent with that of Ferreira and Matos (2008). The latter two authors explain that this weak 
protection is balanced by strong investment prospects or diversification benefits. 
5.1.2 Determinants of Independent and Grey Institutions 
 
Next, I examine whether these determinants also affect independent and grey institutional 
investors. To better understand the heterogeneity and homogeneity among all types of institutions, 
I follow Ferreira and Matos (2008) and further break them down into specific types of institutions. 
Table 3 illustrates the determinants of institutions with detailed breakdown by type. Similar to 
domestic and foreign institutions, independent and grey institutions also share many things in 
common. Both institutions prefer larger firms (SIZE), firms with negative annual stock return 
(RET), more liquid stocks (TURN), firms that are members of the MSCI ACWI (MSCI), firms with 
lower leverage (LEV), and those with less cash (CASH). They also share the same preferences as 
foreign and domestic institutions in terms of country-level characteristics: better disclosure (DISC), 
lower average distance to other markets (DISTANCE), English-speaking countries (ENGLISH), 
higher GDP per capita (GDP), and countries (regions) with lower overall stock overvaluation 
(MCAP). Among grey institutions, bank trusts and insurance companies have several statistically 
significant determinants, but those coefficients are too trivial and are barely economically 
significant.  
Moreover, the R2 for bank trusts and insurance companies are extremely low, that is, the 
explanatory power for these two types of institutions is weak. Such a problem is highly likely due 
to the overall low holdings from bank trusts and insurance companies. As we have seen in Figure 
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3 and Table 2, these two institutions are associated with a maximum holding of 8.2% (the firm that 
has the highest bank ownership in the sample) and 24% (the firm that has the highest insurance 
ownership in the sample), respectively. Thus, the determinants of grey institutions are mainly 
driven by pension funds.  
Furthermore, heterogeneity exists among the three independent institutions. For example, 
investment advisors prefer value stocks (higher BM) while mutual funds do not, and hedge funds 
are indifferent. Both mutual funds and investment advisors prefer firms with higher dividend 
payout (DY), while hedge funds dislike this attribute. These results are also consistent with the 
findings of Ferreira and Matos (2008), except for the strong preference for high share turnover and 
low leverage. 
Overall, the preferences of all institutional investors remain nearly the same as before the 
financial crisis, compared with what Ferreira and Matos (2008) have found from the period 2000–
2005. What significantly altered after the 2008 financial crisis is that institutional investors place 
more value on stocks with higher share turnover and lower leverage. 
5.2 Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
In this section, I examine how institutional investors affect firm performance. The regression 
framework is shown in the following equation: 
Tobin’s 𝑄 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
1
(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) + 𝛽
2
(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)2
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑖(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)
𝑎
𝑖=1










The dependent variable in the equation above is Tobin’s Q (median regression), which is 
calculated as the sum of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided 
by total assets. Nevertheless, it is well-known that such a measurement of Tobin’s Q is imperfect. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2006) argue that the most difficult part of calculating 
Tobin’s Q relates to reflecting the actual replacement cost. Thus, the calculation I use is measured 
with noise, which, as Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2006) mention, “is not symmetric around the 
mean.” Therefore, I follow Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2006) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) and 
use median regressions and two transformations of Tobin’s Q for robustness check: log (Q) and 
−1/Q. Another problem related to the regression is the cross-sectional and time-series dependence. 
I follow Petersen (2009) and use industry- and year-fixed effects to alleviate this dependency. 
However, endogeneity is probably the most common and severe challenge in the estimation of 
ownership structure–firm valuation relation. I address this problem by re-estimating the structure 
using 3SLS regression (discussed in the next section). 
 Table 4 presents the results of the median Q regression for firms that are listed outside the 
U.S. stock market. I find a statistically significant convex relation between total institutional 
ownership and firm performance (Column (1)). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that when 
ownership is low, institutional investors tend to be “free-riders,” which is not beneficial for value-
maximization and for minority shareholders, among others. When the institutional investors’ 
shareholding is substantial enough, their marginal monitoring cost becomes lower, and they begin 
to participate actively in corporate governance. Columns (2) and (3) show results on the 
ownership–performance relation as broken down between foreign and domestic institutions. Again, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, I find a significant convex relation between foreign institutional 
ownership and firm performance and a significant concave relation with regard to domestic 
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institutional investors. Thus, foreign institutional investors, when their shareholding is low, would 
encounter enormous monitoring costs and become less willing to monitor. When their ownership 
is high, having less correlation with the firms they invest in, they exercise better governance 
(Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira, Massa, and Matos, 2010; Aggarwal 
et al., 2011). With further analysis, we can see that the inflection point for foreign institutional 
investors is 24.54%, suggesting that when foreign institutional ownership reaches 24.54%, the 
monitoring (positive) effect dominates. However, the inflection point of total institutional 
ownership is 12.90%, which is almost half that of foreign institutions. This finding supports the 
view that when the ownership level is low, due to differences in culture, geographic distance, 
different legal systems, and restrictions on activities, foreign institutional investors usually 
encounter higher monitoring costs and face more severe information asymmetry (La Porta et al., 
1998; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Kang and Kim, 2010; Deng, Li, and Li, 2018). On the contrary, 
domestic institutions face less information asymmetry because of the same culture, better 
knowledge of policies, and familiarity with the business. However, when domestic institutional 
shareholding is high (beyond the inflection point of 52.87%), due to stronger business ties, they 
tend to form a coalition with management in ways that harm minority shareholders (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010; Bena et al., 2017)8. 
 Next, Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 reveal the outcome of the ownership–value relation 
as broken down by type of institutions. While the relation exhibited by independent institutions 
 
8 In the table that is not shown here, I also examine the same median regression while excluding the observations that 
are 100% owned by domestic institutional investors. This is to test whether the relation between domestic institutional 
ownership and firm performance could be cubic: with the increase of domestic institutional ownership, the firm 
performance increases first, then decreases, and then increases again. However, the result remains consistent as before. 
Moreover, when I dropped observations that are fully owned by domestic institutions, the inflection point increases to 




seems to be partially in line with Hypothesis 3, the relation between grey institutional ownership 
and firm performance is unexpected. In Column (4) we can see that the relation between 
independent institutional ownership and firm performance is positive (though the positive effect is 
non-linear), indicating that the presence of independent institutions (mutual funds, investment 
advisors, and hedge funds) is better for corporate governance and performance (Brickley, Lease, 
and Smith, 1988; Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008; De-la-Hoz and Pombo, 2016). Meanwhile, grey institutions exhibit a relation that 
contradicts that of Ferreira and Matos (2008). However, as illustrated in Tables 1 and 3, although 
categorized under grey institutions, bank trusts and insurance companies only play a minor role 
due to overall low shareholding. Thus, similar to our findings in Table 3, the impact of grey 
institutional investors is highly likely to be dominated by pension funds. Therefore, the result for 
grey institutions is not inconsistent with the findings of Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) and 
Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005), both of whom consider pension funds as “active” investors. 
To further examine the heterogeneity among all types of institutions, I re-estimate the 
regression in Table 4 with a detailed breakdown of each type of institution. The results are shown 
in Table 5. Column (1) of Table 5 indicates a concave relation between mutual fund ownership 
and firm performance, suggesting that a high level of mutual fund shareholding is detrimental to 
firm valuation, while low-level ownership has a positive effect. The finding here does not depart 
from Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016), who conclude that increased mutual fund ownership is 
correlated with improved corporate governance. This is true when the mutual fund ownership is 
not too high. When the ownership increases beyond a certain threshold (33.92%), mutual fund 
managers become more reluctant to oppose management decisions due to business ties (Davis and 
Kim, 2007). Presented in Column (2), investment advisors exhibit a convex ownership–value 
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structure, suggesting that high ownership (beyond 35.95%) has a positive effect on firm 
performance (Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005). The 
negative impact of low investment-advisor ownership is probably due to the potential “free-rider” 
problem. Hedge fund ownership, which is shown in Column (3), denotes a negative quadratic 
impact on firm performance. Further, this negative impact is merely significant at the 10% level. 
The result for hedge funds does not deviate from arguments of the positive impact of hedge fund 
activism. Studies that find a positive outcome from hedge fund activism focus more on short-term 
stock performance, such as abnormal returns (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Klein and 
Zur, 2009; Mietzner and Schweizer, 2014; Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 2015; Denes, Karpoff, and 
McWilliams, 2016). The ownership–performance relation is reflected more clearly on long-term 
firm performance instead of short-term stock performance. The negative coefficient of the 
quadratic item here indicates that a higher shareholding by hedge funds could be detrimental to 
firms’ long-term performance (Cremers, Masconale, and Sepe, 2016; deHaan, Larcker, and 
McClure, 2019). 
 Columns (4) to (6) show the results for three grey institutions: bank trusts, insurance 
companies, and pension funds. Surprisingly, in Column (4), I find a convex relation between bank 
trust shareholding and firm performance, despite bank trusts owning, on average, only a small 
percentage. Combining all studies mentioned above (relating to banks), I conclude that bank trust 
ownership probably impacts firm valuation through improved credit offering instead of direct 
monitoring on management decisions. The plausible explanation here is that bank trusts, unlike 
investment advisors, do not participate in daily corporate governance, such as voting or restricting 
management. However, they fulfill a monitoring role as creditors since (comparably) high 
ownership (in this case, 4.22% as the inflection point) could probably facilitate credits offered by 
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banks (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Lin Zhang, and Zhu., 2009; Zemzem, Guesmi, and Ftouhi, 
2017 ). This also explains why Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) find that grey institutions 
(including bank trusts) are reluctant to vote against management decisions and Almazan, Hartzell, 
and Starks (2005) document a negative impact on pay-for-performance practices from grey 
institutions. Low bank trust ownership that does not facilitate bank loans and that is also passive 
on direct corporate governance, would generate a negative impact on firm performance. Taken 
together, the relation between bank ownership and firm valuation is convex. However, due to data 
limitations, I did not perform a formal test.  
 I do not find a significant relationship between insurance company ownership and firm 
performance, nor do I find much literature concerning the impact of insurance companies. Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith (1988), Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005), and Ferreira and Matos (2008) all 
consider insurance companies as grey institutions and indicate that they do not pursue value-
maximization or corporate governance, either measured by voting, pay-for-performance practices, 
or firm valuation. However, it is unclear whether the pattern documented by these studies could 
represent insurance companies. The pattern from grey institutions may be mainly capturing bank 
trusts or pension funds, similar to the results in Table 3. Moreover, I do not find studies that focus 
uniquely on insurance companies. Thus, how insurance companies as shareholders affect firm 
performance remains ambiguous. Future analysis is needed here. Pension funds, which represent 
the majority of grey institutions, reveal a convex impact on firm performance. Moreover, the 
inflection point of pension funds is relatively low, at only 8.01%, compared to 12.90% for the total 
institutional ownership. The evidence suggests that, similar to foreign institutional investors and 
investment advisors, when pension funds hold less than 8.01% of the outstanding shares, because 
of potential “free-rider” problems or high monitoring costs, they have detrimental effects on firm 
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performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
When they hold shares beyond the inflection point (8.01%), pension funds improve firm 
performance by voting more frequently due to less pressure (Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; 
Cremers and Nair, 2005), increased pay-for-performance sensitivity (Almazan, Hartzell, and 
Starks, 2005), and better corporate governance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). 
 Therefore, due to heterogeneity issues, it is hard to “categorize” different types of 
institutions as independent or grey. Groupings in previous research would render the results 
unexplainable, especially when we are looking at non-U.S. international data. 
 Moreover, I find some interesting evidence from the control variables. Specifically, the 
level of institutional ownership concentration (HERF) is positively related to firm performance, 
further supporting the “free-rider” theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Firms that are cross-listed on U.S. stock exchanges (ADR) have better 
performance than firms that are not. In my sample, when controlling for the total institutional 
ownership, firms that are cross-listed (ADR) have a mean Tobin’s Q that is 3.69% higher than 
single-listed firms. This is consistent with Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), who propose that 
cross-listing is associated with risk premium reduction, access to more developed capital markets, 
better information disclosure, and better corporate governance. 
5.3 Robustness Tests 
5.3.1 Alternative Measurement of Tobin’s Q 
 
For the robustness tests, I first re-estimate the regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
with two alternative transformations of Tobin’s Q: log (Q) and -1/Q to alleviate potential 
measurement errors (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2006; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Table 6 
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presents the outcomes using the two alternative dependent variables with the generalized 
breakdown. I find that most of the results remain consistent with those obtained from using the 
median Q regression (as shown in Table 4), especially for foreign and domestic institutions. 
However, when I use -1/Q as the predicted variable, only the quadratic coefficient of total 
institutional ownership is statistically significant, and the linear coefficient is even not 
economically significant. One possible explanation is that the inverse effect from foreign and 
domestic institutional investors, when combined into total institutions, partially neutralizes the 
effect. Furthermore, neither the linear nor the quadratic coefficient of independent institutional 
ownership is significant. Similar to total institutional ownership the concave and convex impact 
from mutual funds and investment advisors would render the relation between independent 
institutional ownership and firm performance insignificant. 
To further investigate what causes the inconsistency among independent institutions, I 
study the OLS regression for each type of institution. Table 7 demonstrates the two OLS 
regressions with detailed breakdown by type of institution. Again, I find that all the relations 
remain the same as those in the median regression: a concave relation between mutual fund 
ownership and firm performance and convex effects on firm valuation from investment advisors, 
bank trusts, and pension funds. One exception here concerns hedge funds. When I regress -1/Q as 
a measure of firm performance, hedge fund ownership exhibits a significant and concave relation 
with -1/Q. Indeed, if we revisit Table 5 and Panel A of Table 7, we do find a concave relation 
between firm valuation and hedge fund ownership, but the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, there is weak evidence that a high percentage of hedge fund shareholding 
could be detrimental to firms’ performance (Cremers, Masconale, and Sepe, 2016; deHaan, 
Larcker, and McClure, 2019). 
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5.3.2 Country-fixed effects and Fama–MacBeth regression 
 
Moreover, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) argue that country characteristics are 
important when determining corporate governance. They also state that proxies, such as the legal 
environment and economic development, are less effective than country-fixed effects. Therefore, 
in Panel A of Table 8, I re-estimate the median Q regression, substituting country dummy variables 
for country-level control variables. Another problem related to Tobin’s Q regression is cross-
sectional dependence (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2006). Petersen (2009) propose that Fama–
MacBeth regression generates unbiased standard errors in the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence (or in his terminology, time effect). Thus, I regress the impact of institutional 
ownership on firm performance using Fama–MacBeth and log (Q) as the firm performance 
measure. The result is presented in Panel B of Table 8. Most results in both Panels A and B are 
consistent with the previous regression results. However, the total of institutional investors 
demonstrates no significant impact on firm valuation. One possible explanation is that the inverse 
effects from foreign and domestic institutional ownership neutralize the effect of the total 
institutions. Moreover, independent institutions indicate a different pattern. In Panel A (country-
fixed effects), independent institutional ownership has a significant convex effect on firm 
performance, while in Panel B (Fama–MacBeth regression), neither coefficient is statistically 
significant. 
Since the effect from independent institutional investors is always ambiguous in all 
previous regressions, I again re-estimate the above two robustness regression on each type of 
institution. The results are shown in Table 9: Panel A substitutes country-fixed effects for country-
level control variables and Panel B uses Fama–MacBeth regression. Again, the results in both 
panels are consistent with the primary finding: a concave relation between mutual fund ownership 
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and firm performance, convex effects from investment advisors, bank trusts, and pension funds, 
and no impact from hedge funds and insurance companies. 
5.3.3 Endogeneity concern 
 
Another major concern with the ownership–valuation regression is that institutional 
ownership and firm performance might be jointly determined (endogeneity problem) (Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick, 2006; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Indeed, it is highly likely that firms with better 
performance and governance (or other firm and country characteristics, refer to Section 5.1 and 
Table 2 and 3) attract institutional investors. To address this problem, I follow Ferreira and Matos 
(2008) and implement the simultaneous equations model. The 3SLS method, developed by Zellner 
and Theil (1962), takes one more step (than the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method) to estimate 
all coefficients simultaneously using the moment matrix generated in the second step (from 2SLS) 
(Zellner and Theil, 1962). The 3SLS method is suggested to be asymptotically more efficient than, 
or at least as efficient as, the 2SLS (Zellner and Theil, 1962; Madansky, 1964; Belsley, 1987; 
Robinson, 1991). The 3SLS method has also been implemented in non-linear regressions 
(Jorgenson and Laffont, 1974; Amemyia, 1977). Following Kim and Lu (2011), I use R&D 
expenditure as one independent variable. The other independent variables are firm characteristics 
incorporated in the determinant regression but are not in the ownership–performance regression, 
such as the MSCI dummy (MSCI) and share turnover (TURN). Table 10 reports the results of the 
3SLS regressions of total institutional ownership and the generalized breakdown. The results in 
Panel A to E are still consistent with the previous findings. The patterns for all institutions maintain 
the same sign and statistical significance, except that independent institutions require further 
scrutiny since the relation is always inconsistent. 
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Thus, I re-estimate the simultaneous regressions on each type of institution. Table 11 shows 
the regression details. I still find the same results for most institutions. The concave relation 
between mutual fund ownership and firm performance remains. Investment advisors, bank trusts, 
and pension funds continue to have convex effects on firm valuation. It is noteworthy that hedge 
funds demonstrate a significant concave impact on firm performance, similar to the results from 
the OLS regression with -1/Q as a response variable (refer to Panel B of Table 7). What is more 
interesting is that insurance companies, which in all previous tables show no significant impact, 
present a significant linear effect on firm performance here. Therefore, my results are robust to the 
endogeneity problem. 
To conclude, foreign and domestic institutions show the most robust effect on firm 
performance. Although grey institutional ownership seems robust, it captures most of the effect of 
pension funds. Thus, the grouping by independent and grey institutions based on pressure-
sensitivity cannot rule out the noise from heterogeneity among institutions. 
6 Conclusion 
 
In this study, I examine the roles of different institutional investors worldwide and how 
they affect firms’ performance. I use a comprehensive database from 2007 to 2016 to test the 
hypotheses with regard to foreign institutional investors becoming dominant shareholders outside 
of the U.S. equity market. 
To better understand the roles these institutional investors play, I first investigate what 
attracts institutional investors. I find that firm size (SIZE) is the most significant attribute that 
attracts all institutional investors. Moreover, all institutions are attracted by firms with negative 
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annual stock return (RET), more liquid stocks (TURN), and lower leverage (LEV). Meanwhile, 
foreign investors (both U.S. and non-U.S.) have strong preference for firms that are members of 
the MSCI ACWI and that are cross-listed on the U.S. stock exchange (ADR), whereas domestic 
institutions are attracted by firms with higher dividend payout (DY). Country characteristics, as 
measured by country-level control variables, are also significant determinants of institutional 
ownership (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007). Comparing the results with those of Ferreira and 
Matos (2008), I find that all institutional investors place more value on lower leverage (LEV) and 
high share turnover (TURN), suggesting that institutional investors have become more prudent on 
credit and liquidity risks after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Next, I examine the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. I 
find that there is a convex relation between total institutional ownership and firm valuation, 
suggesting that a high level of total ownership is positively related to firm performance, while a 
low level of total ownership is susceptible to the “free-rider” problem. I find strong evidence that 
foreign institutional investors have a convex effect on firm performance and domestic institutions 
show an opposite impact. When ownership is low, foreign institutions suffer more from 
information asymmetry and free-rider problems due to differences in culture, geographic distance, 
different legal systems, and restrictions on activities (La Porta et al., 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2003; 
Kang and Kim, 2010; Deng, Li, and Li, 2018). When foreign institutions hold a substantial number 
of shares, they exercise good corporate governance since they have fewer business ties with local 
firms (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira, Massa, and Matos, 2010; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011). On the contrary, domestic institutions are less affected by information 
asymmetry but are subject to business relationships when they hold a certain level of shares (Gillan 
and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010; Bena et al., 2017). 
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Further analysis reveals that previous categorizations of independent and grey institutions 
are compromised by heterogeneity. I find a concave relation between mutual fund ownership and 
firm performance. When holding a high level of shares, mutual fund managers are more likely to 
support management decisions at the cost of other shareholders (Davis and Kim, 2007). Investment 
advisors and pension funds exhibit a convex effect on firm valuation, consistent with the trade-off 
between the “free-rider” problem and good corporate governance. Bank trusts, although also 
showing a convex impact on firm performance, seem not to affect corporate governance the same 
way as investment advisors and pension funds do. They tend to play a monitoring role as creditors 
since higher ownership probably facilitates credits offered by banks (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; 
Lin Zhang, and Zhu., 2009; Zemzem, Guesmi, and Ftouhi, 2017). However, further formal analysis 
is needed here. I do not find a significant effect on firm performance from hedge funds or insurance 
companies. Hedge fund managers usually focus on short-term profitability; thus, the level of hedge 
fund ownership generally does not affect firms’ long-term performance. There is not much 
literature on the specific role of insurance companies. This could be an avenue for future studies. 
The results are robust in several ways, including the endogeneity concern. 
My research could provide insights on investments in the global equity market, especially 
in a world with increasing globalization. Foreign institutional investors are more prevalent than 
before. My research also supplements previous studies by analyzing the quadratic relation between 
institutional ownership and firm performance, providing clearer patterns for different institutions. 
For future research, it would be interesting to further analyze the effect of the changes in 
institutional ownership on corporate governance, abnormal performance, or announcements of 
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Figure 1 Institutional Ownership by location and country 
The figure below illustrates the total institutional ownership with the breakdown of foreign and domestic 



















Figure 2 Institutional ownership trending 
The figure below depicts the trend of total institution among year 2007, 2012, and 2016. Total institutions 












2007 2012 2016 2007 2012 2016 2007 2012 2016 2007 2012 2016 2007 2012 2016
United States Canada United Kingdom France Germany




Figure 3 Institutional ownership by type and country 
The figure below demonstrates the total institutional ownership with the breakdown of different institution 
types (mutual funds, investment advisors, hedge funds, bank trusts, insurance companies, and pension funds) at the 













Institutional Ownership at December 2016 − Institution Type Breakdown






         
Panel A: Institutional ownership variables        
Total institutions IO_TOTAL Total institutional ownership ratio in percentage of market capitalization (FactSet) 
Foreign institutions IO_FOREIGN Foreign institutional ownership ratio in percentage of market capitalization (FactSet) 
Foreign U.S. institutions IO_FOREIGN_US Foreign institutional ownership ratio (US institutions) in percentage of market capitalization 
(FactSet) 
Foreign non-U.S. institutions IO_FOREIGN_NUS Foreign institutional ownership ratio (Non-US institutions) in percentage of market 
capitalization (FactSet) 
Domestic institutions IO_DOMESTIC Domestic institutional ownership ratio in percentage of market capitalization (FactSet) 
Independent institutions IO_INDEP Institutional ownership ratio (independent institutions) in percentage of market capitalization 
(FactSet) 
Grey. institutions IO_GREY Institutional ownership ratio (grey institutions) in percentage of market capitalization 
(FactSet) 
Ownership concentration HERF Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (FactSet) 
  
       
Panel B: Valuation and operation performance 
       
Tobin's Q Q Sum of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by total 
assets (Compustat) 
  
       
Panel C: Firm-level control variables 
       
Market capitalization (log) SIZE Log of annual market capitalization (Compustat) 
Book-to-market (log) BM Log of the book-to-market equity ratio (Compustat) 
Investment opportunities INVOP Two-year geometric average of annual growth in net sales (Compustat) 
Research and Development R&D/K The ratio of research and development expenditures to property, plant, and equipment. We set 
missing observations of R&D/K equal to zero to maintain sample size (Compustat) 
R&D Dummy RDUM A dummy variable equals to one if R&D data are available, and zero otherwise (Compustat) 
Stock return annual RET Annual stock rate of return (Compustat) 
Turnover TURN Annual share volume divided by shares outstanding (Compustat) 
  
Dividend yield DY Annual dividends per share divided by price per share (Compustat) 
Return on equity ROE Net income divided by equity (Compustat) 
   
MSCI dummy MSCI MSCI dummy variable, which equals one when the firm is member of MSCI 
ACWI index (iShare Website) 
 
Leverage LEV Ratio of debt to equity (Compustat) 
Cash CASH Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets (Compustat) 
ADR exchange-listed 
dummy 
ADR ADR dummy, which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange (Compustat) 
Global industry Tobin Q GLOBAL_Q Median Tobin's Q of firms in each two-digit SIC global industry) (Compustat) 
  
       
Panel D: Country-level control variables 
       
Legal regime quality index LEGAL Anti-director rights multiplied by the rule of law index (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1998) 
Disclosure DISC Strength of auditing and reporting standards from Global Competitive Report 
Average distance (log) DISTANCE Average bilateral great circle distance in kilometers (log) between a country capital city and 
other capital cities 
English language dummy ENGLISH English dummy variable, which equals one when a country's official language is English 
(CIA World Factbook) 
GDP per capita (log) GDP Annual log GDP per capita (Global Competitive Report) 
Market capitalization to 
GDP 





Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 This table contains mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations of all 
variables. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial 
firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The variables (refer to data description section) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum N 
Panel A: Institutional ownership variables             
Total institutions IO_TOTAL 0.115 0.061 0.146 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Foreign institutions IO_FOREIGN 0.063 0.023 0.104 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Foreign U.S. institutions IO_FOREIGN_US 0.033 0.009 0.076 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Foreign non-U.S. institutions IO_FOREIGN 0.029 0.007 0.049 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Domestic institutions IO_FOREIGN_NUS 0.052 0.017 0.090 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Independent institutions IO_IDEP 0.107 0.056 0.138 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Mutual funds IO_MUTUAL 0.023 0.004 0.044 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Investment advisers IO_INVEST 0.078 0.038 0.103 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Hedge funds IO_HEDGE 0.005 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.881     78,547  
Grey institutions IO_GREY 0.008 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.411     78,547  
Bank trusts IO_BANK 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.082     78,547  
Pension funds IO_PENSION 0.008 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.411     78,547  
Insurance companies IO_INSURANCE 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.240     78,547  
Ownership concentration HERF 0.408 0.277 0.343 0.009 1.000     78,547  
        
Panel B: Valuation variable        
Tobin Q Q 1.448 1.091 1.106 0.470 7.707     78,547  
        
Panel C: Firm-level control variables        
Market capitalization (log) SIZE 5.455 5.239 1.780 1.677 10.620     78,547  
Book-to-market (log) BM -0.263 -0.197 0.879 -2.996 1.688     78,547  
Investment opportunities INVOP 0.056 0.048 0.202 -0.608 0.750     78,547  
Research and Development R&D/K 0.099 0.000 0.369 0.000 3.099     78,547  
R&D Dummy RDUM 0.506 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Stock return annual RET 0.229 -0.012 1.336 -0.877 11.056     78,547  
Turnover TURN 0.996 0.466 1.557 0.013 10.372     78,547  
MSCI dummy MSCI 0.034 0.000 0.181 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Dividend yield DY 0.018 0.011 0.023 0.000 0.119     78,547  
Return on equity ROE 0.027 0.073 0.314 -2.297 0.630     78,547  
Leverage LEV 0.456 0.465 0.214 0.000 0.893     78,547  
Cash CASH 0.171 0.126 0.154 0.001 0.782     78,547  
ADR exchange-listed dummy ADR 0.033 0.000 0.179 0.000 1.000     78,547  
Global industry Tobin Q GLOBAL_Q 1.246 1.188 0.227 0.909 1.701     78,547  
        
Panel D: Country-level control variables       
Legal regime quality index LEGAL 23.884 17.960 12.371 0.000 50.000     78,547  
Disclosure DISC 5.552 5.600 0.543 3.900 6.700     78,547  
Average Distance (log) DISTANCE 8.944 9.033 0.243 8.566 9.593     78,547  
English language dummy ENGLISH 0.347 0.000 0.476 0.000 1.000     78,547  
GDP per capita (log) GDP 10.169 10.558 0.981 6.885 11.516     78,547  






Table 1a Correlation Matrix 
This table contains the Pearson Correlation Coefficients among all variables. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. 
All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The variables (refer to data description section) are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles.  
 Q IO_TOTAL HERF SIZE BM INVOP RDK RDUM RET TURN DY ROE MSCI LEV CASH ADR GLOBAL_Q ROA LEGAL DISC DISTANCE ENGLISH GDP MCAP 
Q 1.000                        
IO_TOTAL 0.156 1.000                       
HERF -0.138 -0.506 1.000                      
SIZE 0.253 0.437 -0.660 1.000                     
BM -0.794 -0.239 0.223 -0.376 1.000                    
INVOP 0.186 0.065 -0.054 0.078 -0.210 1.000                   
RDK 0.227 0.084 -0.014 -0.070 -0.183 0.047 1.000                  
RDUM 0.031 0.027 -0.116 0.082 -0.024 -0.068 0.264 1.000                 
RET 0.170 -0.007 0.010 0.048 -0.185 0.113 0.017 -0.015 1.000                
TURN 0.081 0.059 -0.052 0.096 -0.101 0.036 0.035 0.102 0.131 1.000               
DY -0.129 0.028 -0.058 0.052 0.146 -0.034 -0.110 -0.044 -0.081 -0.128 1.000              
ROE 0.073 0.091 -0.159 0.277 -0.072 0.135 -0.128 0.003 0.068 -0.028 0.186 1.000             
MSCI 0.043 0.236 -0.196 0.415 -0.089 -0.013 -0.021 0.053 -0.019 0.039 0.039 0.056 1.000            
LEV -0.129 -0.067 -0.034 0.055 -0.044 -0.024 -0.161 -0.051 -0.037 0.031 -0.003 -0.085 0.041 1.000           
CASH 0.279 -0.062 0.044 -0.066 -0.191 0.018 0.318 0.128 0.063 0.065 -0.030 0.004 -0.060 -0.395 1.000          
ADR 0.037 0.020 -0.030 0.129 -0.052 0.002 -0.019 -0.060 -0.007 0.067 -0.025 0.026 0.087 0.019 -0.032 1.000         
GLOBAL_Q 0.228 0.091 -0.054 0.011 -0.248 0.088 0.236 0.150 0.030 0.012 -0.070 -0.024 0.031 -0.148 0.199 -0.029 1.000        
ROA 0.116 0.081 -0.164 0.291 -0.147 0.138 -0.171 0.004 0.072 -0.016 0.210 0.836 0.050 -0.063 -0.002 0.037 -0.024 1.000       
LEGAL 0.088 0.265 -0.012 -0.052 -0.072 0.084 0.046 -0.159 0.016 -0.102 0.074 -0.082 0.016 -0.258 -0.012 -0.099 0.038 -0.117 1.000      
DISC 0.063 0.196 -0.078 -0.015 -0.081 0.030 0.075 -0.066 -0.013 -0.142 0.076 -0.027 0.010 -0.174 0.062 -0.111 0.039 -0.065 0.496 1.000     
DISTANCE -0.058 -0.298 0.114 -0.002 0.122 0.000 -0.130 -0.035 0.001 0.071 0.084 0.007 -0.029 -0.173 0.085 0.016 -0.090 0.001 0.108 0.077 1.000    
ENGLISH 0.127 0.221 0.023 -0.040 -0.112 0.126 0.010 -0.226 0.028 -0.122 0.038 -0.040 -0.009 -0.153 -0.068 -0.058 0.040 -0.061 0.774 0.342 0.091 1.000   
GDP -0.069 0.149 -0.127 0.010 0.061 -0.084 0.092 0.086 -0.040 -0.050 0.060 -0.101 0.065 -0.087 0.087 -0.198 0.056 -0.150 0.202 0.413 -0.053 -0.212 1.000  
MCAP 0.045 -0.065 0.076 0.026 -0.010 0.023 -0.032 -0.102 0.026 -0.047 0.046 0.011 -0.012 -0.114 0.106 -0.019 -0.041 0.018 0.344 0.328 0.109 0.356 0.051 1.000 
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Table 2 Determinants of institutional ownership: Foreign vs. Domestic 
        This table demonstrates the parameter estimates of OLS regression of institutional ownership for non-U.S. firms by 
total, foreign, and domestic institutions. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. The definitions 
of all variables are provided in Appendix Table A1.  The regressions include year fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-
4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables 
(refer to data description section) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.  









         
SIZE  0.0306*** 0.0359*** 0.0354*** 0.0289*** 0.0169*** 0.0120*** 0.0070*** 
  (85.83) (110.97) (132.41) (104.45) (74.89) (103.65) (37.23)    
BM  -0.0228*** -0.0003 0.0026 0.0033*** 0.0036*** -0.0003 -0.0036*** 
  (-34.48) (-0.49) (4.77) (7.02) (9.72) (-1.35) (-9.38)    
INVOP  0.0117*** 0.0017 -0.0025 0.0026 -0.0022 0.0048*** -0.0010    
  (4.57) (0.76) (-1.29) (1.52) (-1.61) (5.36) (-0.63)    
RET  -0.0047*** -0.0041*** -0.0043*** -0.0028*** -0.0018*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** 
  (-12.10) (-11.82) (-14.86) (-10.55) (-8.34) (-8.10) (-5.48)    
TURN  0.0027*** 0.0094*** 0.0095*** 0.0071*** 0.0061*** 0.0010*** 0.0024*** 
  (7.99) (30.20) (37.29) (24.53) (24.09) (10.56) (15.80)    
DY  0.1564*** 0.1112*** 0.4724*** -0.0510*** -0.0503*** -0.0008 0.1623*** 
  (7.43) (5.97) (45.16) (-3.78) (-4.83) (-0.11) (12.00)    
ROE  -0.0178*** 0.0004 0.6253*** -0.0105*** -0.0083*** -0.0022*** 0.0109*** 
  (-10.42) (0.29) (59.77) (-9.35) (-8.88) (-4.22) (10.33)    
MSCI  0.0575*** 0.0230*** 0.6616*** 0.0434*** 0.0298*** 0.0136*** -0.0204*** 
  (14.32) (6.75) (63.25) (13.84) (11.15) (11.61) (-11.36)    
LEV  -0.1014*** -0.0614*** 3.5199*** -0.0550*** -0.0547*** -0.0003 -0.0064*** 
  (-35.72) (-25.00) (336.48) (-26.37) (-30.46) (-0.36) (-4.11)    
CASH  -0.1103*** -0.0186*** 0.0213 0.0057** -0.0014 0.0071*** -0.0243*** 
  (-30.29) (-5.86) (2.03) (2.22) (-0.68) (5.91) (-11.74)    
ADR  -0.0359*** 0.0139*** 0.1039*** 0.0227*** 0.0101*** 0.0126*** -0.0088*** 
  (-13.50) (5.81) (9.94) (9.68) (5.50) (11.61) (-8.57)    
LEGAL   0.0015***  -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 0.0018*** 
   (21.21)  (-5.72) (-4.30) (-4.72) (43.80)    
DISC   0.0280***  0.0048*** 0.0005 0.0042*** 0.0232*** 
   (28.75)  (5.14) (0.69) (10.14) (44.66)    
DISTANCE   -0.1990***  -0.0693*** -0.0317*** -0.0376*** -0.1297*** 
   (-101.93)  (-44.98) (-26.42) (-45.94) (-93.55)    
ENGLISH   0.0722***  0.0370*** 0.0297*** 0.0074*** 0.0352*** 
   (39.71)  (21.17) (20.51) (9.01) (34.86)    
GDP   0.0175***  0.0124*** 0.0089*** 0.0035*** 0.0051*** 
   (31.12)  (22.73) (19.67) (14.01) (17.02)    
MCAP   -0.0149***  -0.0045*** -0.0033*** -0.0012*** -0.0104*** 
   (-80.29)  (-30.38) (-30.85) (-15.82) (-98.51)    
         
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies  No No Yes No No No No 
F-Stat  743.03 1194.18 1589.69 711.92 410.09 747.82 719.07 
R2  0.2295 0.4499 0.5081 0.3331 0.2361 0.2585 0.3418 
Number of Firms          14,526          14,526          14,526          14,526          14,526  14,526          14,526  




Table 3 Determinants of institutional ownership: Independent vs. Grey 
        This table demonstrates the parameter estimates of OLS regression of institutional ownership for non-U.S. firms by 
independent institutions and grey institutions. The dependent is institutional ownership ratio in percentage of market 
capitalization. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. The definitions of all variables are 
provided in Appendix Table A1. The regressions include year fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial 
firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer to data 
description section) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 


















        
SIZE 0.032*** 0.006*** 0.025*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 
 (104.12) (58.61) (111.39) (14.74) (83.35) (4.93) (18.61) (81.31)    
BM -0.001 -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (-1.32) (-12.43) (3.95) (0.88) (5.92) (4.08) (0.91) (5.77)    
INVOP 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 
 (1.26) (0.63) (0.25) (2.96) (-3.25) (-0.07) (0.49) (-3.37)    
RET -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-11.16) (-4.73) (-12.66) (-0.72) (-8.04) (-0.64) (-5.67) (-7.33)    
TURN 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.001*** 
 (28.87) (20.24) (27.21) (15.44) (20.39) (8.70) (-1.50) (20.75)    
DY 0.085*** 0.035*** 0.092*** -0.042*** 0.027*** -0.000 0.000 0.026*** 
 (4.72) (5.43) (6.58) (-10.99) (8.93) (-1.18) (1.06) (8.90)    
ROE 0.002 0.001** 0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.002*** 
 (1.61) (2.11) (3.62) (-6.18) (-9.16) (-3.29) (-4.27) (-8.42)    
MSCI 0.020*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.003*** 
 (6.09) (4.90) (6.10) (1.76) (7.68) (8.28) (0.89) (7.37)    
LEV -0.059*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.002*** 
 (-24.83) (-26.27) (-12.84) (-25.50) (-8.22) (-6.27) (-4.53) (-7.14)    
CASH -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.003 0.001 -0.007*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.006*** 
 (-3.93) (-8.90) (-1.45) (0.74) (-15.85) (-3.69) (0.54) (-16.07)    
ADR 0.015*** -0.001 0.014*** 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000** 0.000* -0.002*** 
 (6.61) (-1.16) (8.41) (5.88) (-6.06) (2.09) (1.90) (-7.70)    
LEGAL 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000    
 (23.15) (25.14) (19.12) (3.25) (-5.55) (3.06) (-17.30) (-0.70)    
DISC 0.022*** 0.005*** 0.017*** -0.000 0.006*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.006*** 
 (23.69) (13.50) (26.63) (-0.54) (31.04) (4.20) (-3.75) (31.80)    
DISTANCE -0.187*** -0.036*** -0.137*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.011*** 
 (-99.22) (-54.91) (-94.05) (-31.53) (-40.10) (-6.60) (-27.09) (-36.68)    
ENGLISH 0.070*** 0.017*** 0.046*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (40.03) (28.41) (36.16) (18.98) (11.01) (5.59) (23.43) (3.79)    
GDP 0.017*** -0.006*** 0.020*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (30.79) (-27.92) (53.82) (19.77) (13.33) (1.53) (-4.20) (16.43)    
MCAP -0.014*** -0.003*** -0.010*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-78.07) (-46.05) (-77.25) (-22.19) (-39.67) (-10.08) (-19.95) (-38.03)    
 
        
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat 1105.12 593.53 1232.80 82.06 509.15 14.87 48.86 504.35 
R2 0.4323 0.2396 0.4262 0.0710 0.2052 0.0101 0.0476 0.2024 
Number of Firms 14,526 14,526 14,526 14,526 14,526 14,526 14,526 14,526 





Table 4 Institutional ownership and firm value: median regression 
        This table demonstrates the parameter estimates of median regression of Tobin’s Q for non-U.S. firms. The definitions 
of all variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. 
The regressions include year and industry fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) 
are excluded. The robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer to data description section) are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
      
IO_TOTAL -0.1099**                    
 (-2.40)                    
(IO_TOTAL)2 0.4259***                    
 (7.05)                    
IO_FOREIGN  -0.5111***                   
  (-9.97)                   
(IO_FOREIGN)2  1.0415***                   
  (14.36)                   
IO_DOMESTIC   0.4697***                  
   (7.46)                  
(IO_DOMESTIC)2   -0.4442***                  
   (-3.61)                  
IO_INDEP    -0.0342                 
    (-0.72)                 
(IO_INDEP)2    0.3690***                 
    (5.65)                 
IO_GREY     -2.1010*** 
     (-8.68)    
(IO_GREY)2     12.7613*** 
     (8.94)    
HERF 0.1160*** 0.1047*** 0.1425*** 0.1211*** 0.1099*** 
 (11.40) (11.29) (14.82) (11.98) (11.81)    
SIZE 0.1723*** 0.1726*** 0.1682*** 0.1716*** 0.1671*** 
 (24.37) (25.22) (24.13) (24.33) (23.91)    
(SIZE)2 -0.0054*** -0.0049*** -0.0048*** -0.0054*** -0.0043*** 
 (-9.72) (-8.89) (-8.80) (-9.71) (-7.71)    
INVOP 0.3476*** 0.3436*** 0.3414*** 0.3456*** 0.3424*** 
 (30.28) (30.94) (30.23) (30.17) (30.16)    
R&D/K 0.3314*** 0.3358*** 0.3317*** 0.3322*** 0.3355*** 
 (47.31) (49.57) (48.17) (47.53) (48.46)    
RDUM -0.0481*** -0.0500*** -0.0473*** -0.0482*** -0.0493*** 
 (-9.07) (-9.74) (-9.08) (-9.10) (-9.40)    
LEV 0.2742*** 0.2706*** 0.2713*** 0.2749*** 0.2663*** 
 (22.03) (22.46) (22.25) (22.13) (21.74)    
CASH 0.0504 0.0689* 0.0564 0.0509 0.0408    
 (1.17) (1.65) (1.32) (1.18) (0.95)    
(CASH)2 1.7028*** 1.6731*** 1.6969*** 1.7016*** 1.7147*** 
 (25.22) (25.62) (25.55) (25.26) (25.68)    
ADR 0.0369*** 0.0416*** 0.0433*** 0.0366*** 0.0378*** 
 (2.83) (3.30) (3.38) (2.81) (2.93)    
GLOBAL_Q 0.5346*** 0.5312*** 0.5264*** 0.5330*** 0.5297*** 
 (32.28) (33.17) (32.31) (32.25) (32.37)    
LEGAL 0.0033*** 0.0037*** 0.0031*** 0.0033*** 0.0036*** 
 (9.05) (10.39) (8.42) (8.93) (9.87)    
DISC 0.0691*** 0.0705*** 0.0601*** 0.0691*** 0.0709*** 
 (12.70) (13.46) (11.12) (12.75) (13.15)    
DISTANCE -0.2010*** -0.2199*** -0.1806*** -0.1950*** -0.2243*** 
 (-18.95) (-22.80) (-17.23) (-18.45) (-22.76)    
ENGLISH 0.0630*** 0.0653*** 0.0564*** 0.0601*** 0.0701*** 
 (6.31) (6.81) (5.75) (6.03) (7.17)    
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
GDP -0.0593*** -0.0592*** -0.0571*** -0.0593*** -0.0569*** 
 (-17.71) (-18.28) (-17.39) (-17.74) (-17.24)    
MCAP -0.0235*** -0.0246*** -0.0216*** -0.0232*** -0.0254*** 
 (-18.14) (-20.02) (-16.72) (-17.91) (-20.20)    
      
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms                14,526                 14,526                 14,526                 14,526                   14,526  





Table 5 Institutional ownership and firm value: detailed breakdown by institution types 
 This table demonstrates the parameter estimates of median regression of Tobin’s Q by breaking independent 
(IO_INDEP) and grey (IO_GREY) institutions into specific type of institutions. The definitions of all variables are 
provided in Appendix Table A1. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. The regressions 
include year and industry fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. 
The robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer to data description section) are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6)           
IO_MUTAL 1.5652***                     
 (16.33)                     
(IO_MUTAL)2 -2.3069***                     
 (-7.47)                     
IO_INVEST  -0.5310***                    
  (-8.57)                    
(IO_INVEST)2  1.4771***                    
  (12.04)                    
IO_HEDGE   0.2448                   
   (1.53)                   
(IO_HEDGE)2   -0.7957*                   
   (-1.87)                   
IO_BANK    -29.5416***                  
    (-3.65)                  
(IO_BANK)2    350.3490***                  
    (3.06)                  
IO_INSURANCE     -0.9721                 
     (-0.90)                 
(IO_INSURANCE)2     4.1646                 
     (0.35)                 
IO_PENSION      -2.2108*** 
      (-8.96)    
(IO_PRENSION)2      13.7968*** 
      (9.57)    
HERF 0.1436*** 0.0993*** 0.1208*** 0.1207*** 0.1197*** 0.1097*** 
 (15.34) (10.11) (13.08) (13.11) (13.11) (11.82)    
SIZE 0.1724*** 0.1711*** 0.1716*** 0.1693*** 0.1710*** 0.1676*** 
 (24.84) (24.60) (24.63) (24.26) (24.70) (24.03)    
(SIZE)2 -0.0057*** -0.0051*** -0.0051*** -0.0048*** -0.0050*** -0.0043*** 
 (-10.35) (-9.19) (-9.30) (-8.77) (-9.22) (-7.78)    
INVOP 0.3374*** 0.3477*** 0.3438*** 0.3422*** 0.3432*** 0.3426*** 
 (29.94) (30.80) (30.48) (30.20) (30.57) (30.24)    
R&D/K 0.3217*** 0.3322*** 0.3331*** 0.3339*** 0.3316*** 0.3352*** 
 (46.80) (48.24) (48.36) (48.32) (48.44) (48.52)    
RDUM -0.0467*** -0.0487*** -0.0480*** -0.0479*** -0.0478*** -0.0493*** 
 (-8.97) (-9.33) (-9.22) (-9.15) (-9.22) (-9.43)    
LEV 0.2885*** 0.2666*** 0.2710*** 0.2685*** 0.2700*** 0.2674*** 
 (23.63) (21.85) (22.06) (21.94) (22.27) (21.87)    
CASH 0.0632 0.0653 0.0599 0.0581 0.0585 0.0443    
 (1.49) (1.53) (1.41) (1.36) (1.38) (1.04)    
(CASH)2 1.7065*** 1.6772*** 1.6847*** 1.6836*** 1.6881*** 1.7109*** 
 (25.75) (25.26) (25.40) (25.27) (25.57) (25.68)    
ADR 0.0370*** 0.0403*** 0.0400*** 0.0412*** 0.0404*** 0.0384*** 
 (2.89) (3.14) (3.12) (3.20) (3.17) (2.99)    
GLOBAL_Q 0.5235*** 0.5309*** 0.5336*** 0.5329*** 0.5335*** 0.5288*** 
 (32.22) (32.59) (32.81) (32.62) (32.95) (32.39)    
LEGAL 0.0029*** 0.0033*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 
 (8.13) (9.11) (9.80) (9.77) (9.75) (10.09)    
DISC 0.0653*** 0.0724*** 0.0686*** 0.0685*** 0.0687*** 0.0707*** 
 (12.30) (13.56) (12.92) (12.84) (12.98) (13.13)    
DISTANCE -0.1808*** -0.2163*** -0.2141*** -0.2166*** -0.2168*** -0.2233*** 
 (-18.34) (-20.96) (-21.93) (-22.23) (-22.39) (-22.75)    
ENGLISH 0.0491*** 0.0689*** 0.0692*** 0.0713*** 0.0709*** 0.0690*** 
 (5.04) (7.04) (7.11) (7.31) (7.28) (7.07)    
GDP -0.0491*** -0.0565*** -0.0576*** -0.0571*** -0.0578*** -0.0570*** 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6)    
 (-14.77) (-16.98) (-17.54) (-17.35) (-17.70) (-17.29)    
MCAP  -0.0215***   -0.0244***   -0.0246***   -0.0249***   -0.0247***  -0.0255*** 
  (-17.10)   (-19.24)   (-19.67)   (-19.89)   (-19.92)  (-20.30)           
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 14,526  14,526  14,526  14,526  14,526  14,526  





Table 6 Institutional ownership and firm value 
This table presents the estimates of coefficients of regression on firm performance (Tobin’s Q) for non-U.S. firms. Panel A reports the estimates from 
OLS regression with log(Q) as dependent variable while Panel B reports -1/Q as dependent variable. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 
Table A1. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. The regressions include year and industry fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) 
and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer to data description section) are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Panel A   Panel B 
Regression Type OLS  OLS 
Dependent Variable log(Q)  -1/Q 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)    
            
IO_TOTAL -0.110**      -0.000                    
 (-2.40)      (-0.02)                    
(IO_TOTAL)2 0.426***      0.075**                    
 (7.05)      (2.55)                    
IO_FOREIGN  -0.211***      -0.396***                   
 
 (-12.07)      (-14.62)                   
(IO_FOREIGN)2  0.277***      0.536***                   
 
 (10.71)      (14.33)                   
IO_DOMESTIC   0.180***      0.456***                  
 
  (8.34)      (12.91)                  
(IO_DOMESTIC)2   -0.242***      -0.558***                  
 
  (-5.22)      (-7.43)                  
IO_INDEP    -0.013      0.026                 
 
   (-0.84)      (1.11)                 
(IO_INDEP)2    0.038*      0.052                 
 
   (1.80)      (1.61)                 
IO_GREY     -0.774***      -0.968*** 
 
    (-8.33)      (-6.91)    
(IO_GREY)2     3.885***      5.392*** 
 
    (5.80)      (5.49)    
HERF 0.116*** 0.053*** 0.071*** 0.062*** 0.058***  0.115*** 0.097*** 0.136*** 0.117*** 0.108*** 
 (11.40) (19.12) (24.42) (20.92) (20.72)  (21.64) (19.33) (26.17) (22.15) (21.55)    
SIZE 0.172*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.099***  0.219*** 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.218*** 
 (24.37) (46.49) (46.20) (46.81) (46.51)  (55.43) (55.19) (54.60) (55.43) (55.21)    
(SIZE)2 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-9.72) (-21.78) (-23.02) (-23.64) (-22.28)  (-35.01) (-32.92) (-33.78) (-35.04) (-33.77)    
INVOP 0.348*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.152***  0.267*** 0.266*** 0.265*** 0.267*** 0.266*** 
 (30.28) (37.98) (37.93) (38.13) (37.84)  (38.34) (38.15) (38.07) (38.32) (38.12)    
R&D/K 0.331*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.071***  0.105*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 
 (47.31) (25.31) (24.97) (24.97) (25.24)  (25.69) (26.19) (25.69) (25.66) (26.00)    
RDUM -0.048*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018***  -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (-9.07) (-12.27) (-11.97) (-11.90) (-11.97)  (-11.21) (-11.63) (-11.35) (-11.20) (-11.28)    
LEV 0.274*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.084***  0.331*** 0.327*** 0.330*** 0.331*** 0.328*** 
 (22.03) (21.59) (22.09) (21.97) (21.85)  (47.40) (46.92) (47.53) (47.45) (47.25)    
CASH 0.050 0.258*** 0.260*** 0.256*** 0.250***  0.468*** 0.470*** 0.478*** 0.467*** 0.460*** 
 (1.17) (17.75) (17.87) (17.59) (17.16)  (19.86) (19.99) (20.30) (19.83) (19.49)    
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  Panel A   Panel B 
Regression Type OLS  OLS 
Dependent Variable log(Q)  -1/Q 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)    
(CASH)2 1.703*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.181***  0.152*** 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.153*** 0.159*** 
 (25.22) (6.79) (6.75) (6.85) (7.05)  (3.93) (3.87) (3.76) (3.95) (4.10)    
ADR 0.037*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.010**  0.022*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (2.83) (2.86) (2.69) (2.44) (2.37)  (3.19) (3.73) (3.63) (3.14) (3.23)    
GLOBAL_Q 0.535*** 0.233*** 0.230*** 0.232*** 0.232***  0.410*** 0.412*** 0.406*** 0.410*** 0.411*** 
 (32.28) (46.17) (45.67) (46.00) (46.09)  (48.39) (48.64) (47.99) (48.36) (48.51)    
LEGAL 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (9.05) (13.72) (11.97) (13.22) (13.38)  (16.39) (17.21) (14.52) (16.26) (16.86)    
DISC 0.069*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.032***  0.069*** 0.070*** 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 
 (12.70) (20.25) (17.58) (19.83) (20.62)  (26.24) (27.06) (23.16) (26.25) (26.83)    
DISTANCE -0.201*** -0.091*** -0.076*** -0.087*** -0.091***  -0.156*** -0.168*** -0.131*** -0.154*** -0.167*** 
 (-18.95) (-28.81) (-22.62) (-25.74) (-29.04)  (-28.09) (-32.52) (-23.75) (-27.83) (-32.33)    
ENGLISH 0.063*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.036***  0.041*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 
 (6.31) (11.64) (10.47) (11.56) (12.12)  (8.05) (8.32) (6.47) (7.89) (8.81)    
GDP -0.059*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027***  -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.048*** 
 (-17.71) (-27.79) (-27.88) (-27.96) (-27.53)  (-29.13) (-28.83) (-29.02) (-29.17) (-28.60)    
MCAP -0.024*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.010***  -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
 (-18.14) (-19.40) (-16.88) (-18.79) (-19.92)  (-24.32) (-25.34) (-21.65) (-24.20) (-25.65)    
                           
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat 637.84 637.45 643.86 638.18 637.11  768.44 768.71 776.58 768.80 766.06 
R2 0.3652 0.3667 0.3660 0.3652 0.3661  0.3723 0.3739 0.3740 0.3723 0.3726 
Number of Firms     14,526      14,526      14,526      14,526      14,526       14,526      14,526      14,526      14,526      14,526  





Table 7 Institutional ownership and firm value: breakdown 
 This table presents the estimates of coefficients of regressions on firm performance (Tobin’s Q) for non-U.S. firms as broken down by each type of 
institution. Panel A reports the estimates from OLS regression with log(Q) as dependent variable while Panel B reports -1/Q as dependent variable. The definitions 
of all variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. The regressions include year and industry 
fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer 
to data description section) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.  
    Panel A   Panel B 
Regression Type  
OLS  OLS 
Dependent Variable   log(Q) 
 -1/Q 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)    (12)    
               
IO_MUTAL  0.4287***                      0.9176***                     
  (11.39)                      (12.88)                     
(IO_MUTAL)2  -0.7080***                      -1.5388***                     
  (-4.81)                      (-5.10)                     
IO_INVEST   -0.1881***                      -0.3049***                    
  
 (-8.74)                      (-8.44)                    
(IO_INVEST)2   0.3390***                      0.6006***                    
  
 (7.25)                      (7.72)                    
IO_HEDGE    0.0144                      0.3572***                   
  
  (0.28)                      (4.01)                   
(IO_HEDGE)2    -0.1743                      -0.8093***                   
  
  (-1.39)                      (-3.33)                   
IO_BANK     -16.6951***                      -18.4126***                  
  
   (-5.81)                      (-4.22)                  
(IO_BANK)2     201.1809***                      230.7692***                  
  
   (5.79)                      (4.36)                  
IO_INSURANCE      0.0004                      0.3045                 
  
    (0.00)                      (0.69)                 
(IO_INSURANCE)2      -2.5011                      -3.9291                 
  
    (-0.92)                      (-0.97)                 
IO_PENSION       -0.8021***       -1.0280*** 
  
     (-8.26)          (-7.02)    
(IO_PRENSION)2       4.0596***       5.7265*** 
  
     (5.80)          (5.56)    
HERF  0.0714*** 0.0518*** 0.0621*** 0.0623*** 0.0621*** 0.0581***  0.1333*** 0.0972*** 0.1158*** 0.1136*** 0.1135*** 0.1082*** 
  (25.43) (17.66) (22.26) (22.50) (22.41) (20.78)     (26.15) (18.36) (23.14) (22.84) (22.80) (21.58)    
SIZE  0.1003*** 0.0996*** 0.0996*** 0.0992*** 0.0996*** 0.0992***  0.2204*** 0.2186*** 0.2201*** 0.2184*** 0.2190*** 0.2183*** 
  (47.16) (46.74) (46.63) (46.56) (46.82) (46.61)     (55.83) (55.25) (55.57) (55.26) (55.39) (55.27)    
(SIZE)2  -0.0042*** -0.0039*** -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0038***  -0.0107*** -0.0102*** -0.0104*** -0.0103*** -0.0103*** -0.0101*** 
  (-24.62) (-23.09) (-23.54) (-23.21) (-23.64) (-22.37)     (-35.98) (-34.27) (-35.00) (-34.48) (-34.74) (-33.83)    
INVOP  0.1518*** 0.1532*** 0.1529*** 0.1524*** 0.1529*** 0.1516***  0.2648*** 0.2678*** 0.2668*** 0.2667*** 0.2672*** 0.2655*** 
  (37.83) (38.21) (38.13) (38.03) (38.13) (37.83)     (38.01) (38.40) (38.29) (38.27) (38.34) (38.11)    
R&D/K  0.0697*** 0.0709*** 0.0707*** 0.0707*** 0.0707*** 0.0712***  0.1034*** 0.1056*** 0.1046*** 0.1054*** 0.1053*** 0.1059*** 
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    Panel A   Panel B 
Regression Type  
OLS  OLS 
Dependent Variable   log(Q) 
 -1/Q 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)    (12)    
  (24.68) (25.10) (24.99) (25.05) (25.02) (25.25)     (25.32) (25.89) (25.61) (25.85) (25.83) (26.02)    
RDUM  -0.0182*** -0.0184*** -0.0183*** -0.0183*** -0.0183*** -0.0184***  -0.0293*** -0.0297*** -0.0296*** -0.0295*** -0.0296*** -0.0297*** 
  (-11.84) (-11.98) (-11.89) (-11.87) (-11.90) (-11.99)     (-11.15) (-11.29) (-11.23) (-11.21) (-11.22) (-11.29)    
LEV  0.0895*** 0.0835*** 0.0840*** 0.0831*** 0.0842*** 0.0841***  0.3394*** 0.3274*** 0.3314*** 0.3269*** 0.3281*** 0.3280*** 
  (23.20) (21.72) (21.63) (21.60) (21.91) (21.90)     (48.69) (47.17) (47.24) (47.03) (47.28) (47.30)    
CASH  0.2593*** 0.2567*** 0.2553*** 0.2542*** 0.2553*** 0.2501***  0.4736*** 0.4677*** 0.4667*** 0.4641*** 0.4653*** 0.4595*** 
  (17.81) (17.64) (17.54) (17.46) (17.53) (17.17)     (20.12) (19.85) (19.81) (19.69) (19.74) (19.48)    
(CASH)2  0.1730*** 0.1733*** 0.1762*** 0.1767*** 0.1761*** 0.1805***  0.1476*** 0.1496*** 0.1528*** 0.1546*** 0.1540*** 0.1589*** 
  (6.75) (6.76) (6.88) (6.90) (6.87) (7.05)     (3.81) (3.86) (3.94) (3.99) (3.97) (4.10)    
ADR  0.0107** 0.0117*** 0.0108** 0.0114*** 0.0109** 0.0103**   0.0227*** 0.0239*** 0.0221*** 0.0236*** 0.0229*** 0.0224*** 
  (2.44) (2.66) (2.46) (2.59) (2.47) (2.35)     (3.26) (3.44) (3.17) (3.38) (3.29) (3.21)    
GLOBAL_Q  0.2307*** 0.2337*** 0.2322*** 0.2323*** 0.2323*** 0.2322***  0.4079*** 0.4132*** 0.4110*** 0.4111*** 0.4111*** 0.4110*** 
  (45.88) (46.29) (46.05) (46.07) (46.06) (46.07)     (48.32) (48.70) (48.50) (48.50) (48.50) (48.50)    
LEGAL  0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***  0.0026*** 0.0030*** 0.0029*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 
  (11.71) (13.47) (13.44) (13.63) (13.29) (13.67)     (14.73) (16.71) (16.75) (17.01) (16.80) (17.07)    
DISC  0.0294*** 0.0319*** 0.0304*** 0.0304*** 0.0304*** 0.0320***  0.0668*** 0.0712*** 0.0690*** 0.0689*** 0.0689*** 0.0705*** 
  (19.23) (20.78) (19.81) (19.88) (19.86) (20.71)     (25.80) (27.36) (26.64) (26.59) (26.58) (26.89)    
DISTANCE  -0.0787*** -0.0944*** -0.0878*** -0.0882*** -0.0877*** -0.0909***  -0.1436*** -0.1711*** -0.1603*** -0.1632*** -0.1625*** -0.1662*** 
  (-24.79) (-28.41) (-27.97) (-28.32) (-28.06) (-28.96)     (-27.58) (-31.28) (-31.25) (-32.08) (-31.80) (-32.33)    
ENGLISH  0.0307*** 0.0372*** 0.0355*** 0.0355*** 0.0355*** 0.0351***  0.0334*** 0.0455*** 0.0422*** 0.0435*** 0.0431*** 0.0430*** 
  (10.26) (12.39) (11.93) (11.97) (11.88) (11.85)     (6.63) (8.99) (8.41) (8.69) (8.55) (8.60)    
GDP  -0.0252*** -0.0266*** -0.0278*** -0.0278*** -0.0279*** -0.0274***  -0.0430*** -0.0470*** -0.0492*** -0.0488*** -0.0488*** -0.0482*** 
  (-24.65) (-26.26) (-27.77) (-27.83) (-27.84) (-27.44)     (-24.87) (-27.34) (-29.03) (-28.84) (-28.81) (-28.51)    
MCAP  -0.0085*** -0.0097*** -0.0093*** -0.0094*** -0.0093*** -0.0096***  -0.0191*** -0.0212*** -0.0206*** -0.0208*** -0.0207*** -0.0210*** 
  (-17.65) (-19.89) (-19.37) (-19.50) (-19.35) (-19.90)     (-23.27) (-25.57) (-25.14) (-25.40) (-25.30) (-25.65)    
                              
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat  647.02 636.20 636.45 637.38 636.11 637.22  782.46 766.85 766.18 767.84 766.33 766.17 
R2  0.3674 0.3660 0.3652 0.3655 0.3652 0.3661  0.3754 0.3728 0.3722 0.3722 0.3721 0.3726 
Number of Firms  14,526  14,526  14,526          14,526  14,526          14,526   14,526  14,526  14,526          14,526  14,526  14,526  





Table 8 Institutional ownership and firm value: robustness checks 
 This table presents the estimates of coefficients of regression on firm performance (Tobin’s Q) for non-U.S. firms. Panel A reports the estimates of median 
regression using country fixed effects instead of country level control variables. Panel B presents the coefficients of Fama-MacBeth regressions with log(Q) as 
dependent variable. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. The 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The robust t-statistics are 
provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer to data description section) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A   Panel B 
Regression Type Median 
 Fama-MacBeth OLS 
Dependent Variable Q 
 log(Q) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)    
            
IO_TOTAL -0.3215***                     0.0029     
 (-7.04)                     (0.13)     
(IO_TOTAL)2 0.6155***                     0.0246     
 (10.26)                     (0.76)     
IO_FOREIGN  -0.7636***                     -0.1984***    
 
 (-14.60)                     (-4.43)    
(IO_FOREIGN)2  1.3783***                     0.2722***    
 
 (18.32)                     (4.73)    
IO_DOMESTIC   0.4160***                     0.2079***   
 
  (6.29)                     (4.44)   
(IO_DOMESTIC)2   -0.3709***                     -0.2635***   
 
  (-3.00)                     (-3.03)   
IO_INDEP    -0.2321***                     0.0231  
 
   (-4.90)                     (1.07)  
(IO_INDEP)2    0.5787***                     0.0078  
 
   (8.89)                     (0.22)  
IO_GREY     -4.0147***      -0.8243*** 
 
    (-16.17)         (-3.72) 
(IO_GREY)2     16.7674***      3.9390** 
 
    (12.06)         (2.77) 
HERF 0.0628*** 0.0578*** 0.0946*** 0.0694*** 0.0607***  0.0736*** 0.0644*** 0.0830*** 0.0753*** 0.0682*** 
 (6.25) (6.01) (9.83) (6.92) (6.50)     (5.83) (5.43) (6.63) (5.96) (5.69) 
SIZE 0.1546*** 0.1549*** 0.1467*** 0.1536*** 0.1475***  0.1063*** 0.1059*** 0.1052*** 0.1063*** 0.1058*** 
 (22.26) (22.20) (21.04) (22.05) (21.39)     (9.19) (8.94) (8.98) (9.20) (8.94) 
(SIZE)2 -0.0039*** -0.0033*** -0.0033*** -0.0040*** -0.0024***  -0.0044*** -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0044*** -0.0042*** 
 (-7.17) (-6.01) (-6.08) (-7.19) (-4.46)     (5.04) (-4.54) (-4.88) (-5.96) (-4.69) 
INVOP 0.3465*** 0.3457*** 0.3391*** 0.3473*** 0.3384***  0.1503*** 0.1498*** 0.1496*** 0.1502*** 0.1488*** 
 (31.17) (30.98) (30.56) (31.16) (30.63)     (6.47) (6.55) (6.57) (6.47) (6.49) 
R&D/K 0.2895*** 0.2849*** 0.2872*** 0.2901*** 0.2930***  0.0793*** 0.0799*** 0.0792*** 0.0792*** 0.0800*** 
 (42.32) (41.48) (42.07) (42.28) (43.15)     (7.01) (7.11) (7.19) (7.01) (7.10) 
RDUM -0.0154*** -0.0140*** -0.0147*** -0.0153*** -0.0134**   -0.0161*** -0.0167*** -0.0165*** -0.0161*** -0.0160*** 
 (-2.89) (-2.62) (-2.76) (-2.87) (-2.54)     (-3.31) (-3.51) (-3.43) (-3.31) (-3.28) 
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  Panel A   Panel B 
Regression Type Median 
 Fama-MacBeth OLS 
Dependent Variable Q 
 log(Q) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)    
LEV 0.3138*** 0.3143*** 0.3136*** 0.3155*** 0.3154***  0.0799*** 0.0776*** 0.0791*** 0.0802*** 0.0778*** 
 (24.88) (24.80) (24.94) (24.94) (25.22)     (4.82) (4.64) (4.89) (4.84) (4.83) 
CASH 0.3372*** 0.3637*** 0.3331*** 0.3386*** 0.3316***  0.2900*** 0.2921*** 0.2931*** 0.2895*** 0.2838*** 
 (7.91) (8.50) (7.83) (7.92) (7.84)     (4.85) (4.99) (4.87) (4.83) (4.80) 
(CASH)2 1.2983*** 1.2556*** 1.2927*** 1.2900*** 1.2942***  0.1578* 0.1551* 0.1563* 0.1585* 0.1625* 
 (19.73) (19.00) (19.69) (19.55) (19.81)     (1.98) (1.99) (1.93) (1.99) (2.06) 
ADR -0.1855*** -0.1837*** -0.1870*** -0.1879*** -0.1962***  0.0134 0.0153 0.0149 0.0132 0.0133 
 (-10.64) (-10.49) (-10.75) (-10.75) (-11.34)     (0.96) (1.13) (1.06) (0.94) (0.95) 
GLOBAL_Q 0.4876*** 0.4846*** 0.4854*** 0.4878*** 0.4898***  0.1723*** 0.1724*** 0.1722*** 0.1723*** 0.1721*** 
 (30.35) (30.05) (30.27) (30.28) (30.72)     (3.31) (3.30) (3.33) (3.31) (3.30) 
LEGAL       0.0012** 0.0013** 0.0011** 0.0012** 0.0012** 
 
      (3.05) (3.13) (2.71) (3.03) (3.08) 
DISC       0.0397** 0.0407** 0.0365** 0.0396** 0.0415** 
 
      (3.12) (3.11) (2.77) (3.09) (3.18) 
DISTANCE       -0.1003*** -0.1053*** -0.0884*** -0.0987*** -0.1070*** 
 
      (-4.87) (-5.18) (-4.69) (-4.81) (-5.39) 
ENGLISH       0.0300* 0.0303* 0.0266* 0.0294* 0.0317* 
 
      (2.19) (2.25) (1.96) (2.14) (2.38) 
GDP       -0.0292*** -0.0288*** -0.0289*** -0.0292*** -0.0284*** 
 
      (-5.23) (-5.18) (-5.28) (-5.25) (-5.04) 
MCAP       -0.0076*** -0.0079*** -0.0067*** -0.0075*** -0.0081*** 
 
      (-4.90) (-5.03) (-4.19) (-4.88) (-4.97) 
                           
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No No No No No 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms       14,526          14,526          14,526          14,526          14,526           14,526          14,526          14,526          14,526           14,526  





Table 9 Institutional ownership and firm value: robustness checks with detailed breakdown 
 This table presents the estimates of coefficients of regression on firm performance (Tobin’s Q) for non-U.S. firms as broken down by each type of 
institution. Panel A reports the estimates of median regression using country fixed effects instead of country level control variables. Panel B presents the coefficients 
of Fama-MacBeth regressions with log(Q) as dependent variable. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The sample period is from 
2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. The regressions include year and industry fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) 
are excluded. The robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer to data description section) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Panel A   Panel B 
Regression Type Median  Fama-MacBeth OLS 
Dependent Variable Q  log(Q) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
 
IO_MUTAL 1.1952***                      0.4995***     
 
 (12.29)                      (6.33)     
 
(IO_MUTAL)2 -1.8127***                      -0.8410***     
 
 (-5.90)                      (-4.32)     
 
IO_INVEST  -0.7226***                      -0.1599***    
 
 
 (-11.60)                      (1.02)    
 
(IO_INVEST)2  1.7927***                      0.3125***    
 
 
 (14.72)                      (4.11)    
 
IO_HEDGE   0.1869                      0.0338   
 
 
  (1.14)                      (0.22)   
 
(IO_HEDGE)2   -0.5329                      -0.1657   
 
 
  (-1.26)                      (-0.76)   
 
IO_BANK    -27.6600***                      -14.9387*  
 
 
   (-3.42)                      (-2.17)  
 
(IO_BANK)2    317.7433***                      180.8864*  
 
 
   (2.79)                      (2.15)  
 
IO_INSURANCE     -0.5401                      -0.2735 
 
 
    (-0.50)                      (-0.46) 
 
(IO_INSURANCE)2     3.0371                      -0.3782 
 
 
    (0.25)                      (-0.12) 
 
IO_PENSION      -4.2912***       -0.8480*** 
 
     (-16.89)          (-3.61) 
(IO_PRENSION)2      18.1607***       4.0991** 
 
     (12.96)          (2.69) 
HERF 0.0971*** 0.0540*** 0.0809*** 0.0807*** 0.0806*** 0.0604***  0.0836*** 0.0641*** 0.0728*** 0.0727*** 0.0725*** 0.0684*** 
 (10.14) (5.49) (8.59) (8.54) (8.57) (6.51)     (7.23) (5.01) (6.09) (6.10) (6.04) (5.04) 
SIZE 0.1544*** 0.1560*** 0.1513*** 0.1505*** 0.1515*** 0.1489***  0.1072*** 0.1062*** 0.1065*** 0.1060*** 0.1063*** 0.1060*** 
 (22.12) (22.45) (21.61) (21.36) (21.60) (21.72)     (9.30) (9.09) (9.09) (9.07) (9.15) (8.95) 
(SIZE)2 -0.0043*** -0.0039*** -0.0036*** -0.0035*** -0.0036*** -0.0025***  -0.0046*** -0.0043*** -0.0044*** -0.0043*** -0.0044*** -0.0042*** 
 (-7.85) (-7.10) (-6.57) (-6.36) (-6.58) (-4.66)     (-5.29) (-4.86) (-4.99) (-4.92) (-5.05) (-4.68) 
INVOP 0.3377*** 0.3457*** 0.3467*** 0.3448*** 0.3461*** 0.3388***  0.1491*** 0.1507*** 0.1503*** 0.1500*** 0.1503*** 0.1488*** 
 (30.24) (31.15) (31.00) (30.58) (30.85) (30.86)     (6.47) (6.48) (6.46) (6.46) (6.46) (6.48) 
R&D/K 0.2847*** 0.2926*** 0.2913*** 0.2916*** 0.2917*** 0.2911***  0.0783*** 0.0796*** 0.0795*** 0.0796*** 0.0795*** 0.0801*** 
 (41.42) (42.83) (42.28) (42.03) (42.25) (43.12)     (7.13) (6.99) (7.02) (7.03) (7.02) (7.09) 
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  Panel A   Panel B 
Regression Type Median  Fama-MacBeth OLS 
Dependent Variable Q  log(Q) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
RDUM -0.0148*** -0.0151*** -0.0149*** -0.0145*** -0.0141*** -0.0138***  -0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0160*** 
 (-2.77) (-2.85) (-2.79) (-2.69) (-2.63) (-2.62)     (-3.29) (-3.35) (-3.32) (-3.34) (-3.31) (-3.28) 
LEV 0.3175*** 0.3072*** 0.3150*** 0.3138*** 0.3128*** 0.3144***  0.0852*** 0.0783*** 0.0787*** 0.0774*** 0.0785*** 0.0780*** 
 (25.06) (24.41) (24.79) (24.56) (24.60) (25.28)     (5.36) (4.81) (4.59) (4.70) (4.86) (4.84) 
CASH 0.3171*** 0.3406*** 0.3213*** 0.3223*** 0.3238*** 0.3328***  0.2912*** 0.2910*** 0.2893*** 0.2884*** 0.2893*** 0.2838*** 
 (7.41) (8.01) (7.50) (7.46) (7.53) (7.92)     (4.83) (4.93) (4.83) (4.81) (4.84) (4.80) 
(CASH)2 1.3134*** 1.2846*** 1.3153*** 1.3125*** 1.3112*** 1.2897***  0.1577* 0.1551*** 0.1580* 0.1583* 0.1580* 0.1624* 
 (19.87) (19.55) (19.87) (19.67) (19.74) (19.86)     (1.97) (1.98) (1.98) (1.97) (1.98) (2.06) 
ADR -0.1904*** -0.1863*** -0.1917*** -0.1907*** -0.1864*** -0.1988***  0.0134 0.0143*** 0.0137 0.0143 0.0138 0.0132 
 (-10.87) (-10.70) (-10.93) (-10.78) (-10.59) (-11.55)     (0.94) (1.04) (0.97) (1.01) (0.97) (0.94) 
GLOBAL_Q 0.4799*** 0.4852*** 0.4877*** 0.4886*** 0.4878*** 0.4912***  0.1724*** 0.1727*** 0.1724*** 0.1723*** 0.1724*** 0.1720*** 
 (29.73) (30.25) (30.17) (29.98) (30.09) (30.98)     (3.35) (3.30) (3.30) (3.30) (3.30) (3.30) 
LEGAL        0.0010** 0.0012*** 0.0012** 0.0013** 0.0012** 0.0013** 
 
       (2.68) (3.10) (3.06) (3.13) (3.11) (3.19) 
DISC        0.0386** 0.0412*** 0.0399** 0.0400** 0.0399** 0.0417** 
 
       (3.02) (3.26) (3.04) (3.08) (3.06) (3.21) 
DISTANCE        -0.0923*** -0.1077*** -0.1030*** -0.1034*** -0.1033*** -0.1065*** 
 
       (-4.90) (-5.14) (-5.11) (-5.25) (-5.26) (-5.37) 
ENGLISH        0.0257* 0.0321** 0.0310** 0.0311** 0.0314** 0.0308** 
 
       (1.95) (2.34) (2.32) (2.34) (2.45) (2.33) 
GDP        -0.0258*** -0.0280*** -0.0289*** -0.0289*** -0.0289*** -0.0284*** 
 
       (-4.64) (-5.02) (-5.22) (-5.17) (-5.13) (5.06) 
MCAP        -0.0069*** -0.0081*** -0.0078*** -0.0079*** -0.0078*** -0.0081*** 
 
       (-4.37) (-5.15) (-4.87) (-4.88) (-4.80) (-4.98) 
 
             
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes        
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes        
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes        
Number of Firms         14,526          14,526          14,526             14,526          14,526           14,526           14,526          14,526          14,526          14,526  14,526  14,526  





Table 10 Institutional ownership and firm value: three-stage least squares regression 
 This table presents the estimates of coefficients of simultaneous regressions of firm performance (Tobin’s Q) for non-U.S. firms. The dependent variable 
is log(Q). The result in Panel A examines total institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL), in Panel B foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOREIGN), in Panel C 
domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOMESTIC), in Panel D independent institutions (IO_INDEP), and in Panel E grey institutions (IO_GREY). The definitions 
of all variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with no missing variables. The regressions include year and industry 
fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer 
to data description section) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
    Panel A   Panel B   Panel C   Panel D   Panel E 
Institution Type  Total Institutions  Foreign Institutions  Domestic Institutions  Independent Institutions  Grey Institutions 
Dependent Variable   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO 
                
IO  -8.914***   -22.801*** 
 
 27.786***   -3.704***   -60.326***  
  (-14.03)      (-15.03)    
 
 (20.09)      (-11.08)      (-23.95)     
(IO)2  8.398***   19.546*** 
 
 -37.077***   3.458***   210.858***  
  (11.32)      (10.51)    
 
 (-15.76)      (8.49)      (17.15)     
log(Q)  
 -0.648***  
 -0.480***   -0.307*** 
  -0.608***   0.089*** 
  
 (-16.23)     
 (-15.44)      (-12.21)    
  (-15.66)      (15.45)    





  -0.174***   -0.198***  
  (-10.11)    
 
 (-8.89)    
 
 (15.87)    
  (-6.33)      (-12.47)     
SIZE  0.162*** 0.041***  0.241*** 0.030***  -0.060*** 0.007*** 
 0.121*** 0.041***  0.097*** 0.004*** 
 
 (31.61)    (132.14)     (15.62)    (123.69)     (-5.13)    (33.36)    
 (45.51)    (135.39)     (14.12)    (100.34)    





  -0.002***   0.010***  
  (0.92)    
 
 (8.28)    
 
 (6.87)    
  (-6.67)      (12.07)     
BM  
 -0.128***  
 -0.105***   -0.080*** 
  -0.098***   0.024*** 
  
 (-13.55)     
 (-14.31)      (-13.57)    
  (-10.75)      (17.57)    
INVOP  0.185*** 0.028***  0.063**  0.010***  0.018    0.004*** 
 0.171*** 0.043***  0.055*** -0.001*** 
  (19.92)    (11.88)     (2.31)    (5.15)     (0.89)    (2.90)    
 (35.29)    (18.43)     (4.41)    (-3.38)    





  0.063***   0.117***  
  (12.65)    
 
 (3.61)    
 
 (6.84)    
  (21.44)      (16.95)     





  -0.017***   -0.019***  
  (-5.20)    
 
 (-4.11)    
 
 (-2.92)    
  (-8.64)     
 (-3.85)     
RET  
 -0.002***  
 -0.001***   -0.000    
  -0.002***   -0.000*** 
  
 (-5.79)     
 (-4.48)      (-1.31)    
  (-6.49)      (-7.04)    
TURN  
 0.008***  
 0.006***   0.002*** 
  0.007***   0.000*** 
  
 (29.37)     
 (26.25)      (11.76)    
  (27.55)      (3.68)    
DY  
 -0.054***  
 -0.089***   0.025**  
  -0.038**    0.024*** 
  
 (-2.66)     
 (-6.10)      (2.08)    
  (-1.96)      (8.87)    
ROE  
 0.012***  
 0.006***   0.013*** 
  0.010***   -0.004*** 
  
 (7.03)     
 (4.49)      (11.93)    
  (5.89)      (-16.12)    
MSCI  
 0.010***  
 0.028***   -0.021*** 
  0.007***   0.002*** 
  
 (4.08)     
 (14.90)      (-13.73)    
  (2.79)      (6.25)    
LEV  -0.058*** -0.100***  -0.325*** -0.087***  0.206*** -0.042*** 
 0.015*** -0.081***  0.025**  0.008*** 
  (-5.50)    (-23.27)     (-10.71)    (-25.79)     (9.60)    (-15.62)    
 (2.78)    (-19.39)     (1.97)    (12.31)    
CASH  0.373*** 0.061***  0.862*** 0.047***  0.581*** -0.014*** 
 0.336*** 0.096***  -0.376*** -0.009*** 
  (11.54)    (14.02)     (8.95)    (13.75)     (7.69)    (-5.02)    
 (20.02)    (22.63)     (-8.13)    (-14.28)    
(CASH)2  -0.080    
 
 -0.609***   0.251**   
 0.044*     0.770***  
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    Panel A   Panel B   Panel C   Panel D   Panel E 
Institution Type  Total Institutions  Foreign Institutions  Domestic Institutions  Independent Institutions  Grey Institutions 
Dependent Variable   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO 
  (-1.62)    
 
 (-4.16)      (2.29)     
 (1.70)      (11.51)     
ADR  0.099*** 0.016***  0.337*** 0.023***  0.185*** -0.009*** 
 0.050*** 0.018***  -0.035*** -0.001**  
  (8.82)    (6.26)     (10.25)    (11.87)     (7.82)    (-5.57)    
 (8.62)    (7.41)     (-2.61)    (-2.10)    




 -0.003    
  0.220***   0.199***  
  (19.20)    
 
 (5.91)    
 
 (-0.12)    
  (31.42)      (13.10)     
LEGAL  0.007*** 0.001***  0.001    -0.000***  -0.020*** 0.002*** 
 0.004*** 0.002***  -0.000    -0.000*   
  (18.18)    (20.17)     (1.14)    (-7.63)     (-22.13)    (37.49)    
 (19.03)    (23.69)     (-0.69)    (-1.68)    
DISC  0.165*** 0.027***  0.080*** 0.002**   -0.440*** 0.021*** 
 0.078*** 0.024***  0.207*** 0.007*** 
  (18.04)    (25.25)     (6.12)    (1.98)     (-19.42)    (31.08)    
 (18.35)    (23.35)     (27.90)    (43.11)    
DISTANCE  -0.907*** -0.207***  -0.853*** -0.073***  1.795*** -0.123*** 
 -0.432*** -0.204***  -0.471*** -0.013*** 
  (-21.14)    (-109.45)     (-24.29)    (-49.47)     (24.61)    (-104.36)    
 (-19.86)    (-111.26)     (-29.76)    (-47.03)    
ENGLISH  0.324*** 0.084***  0.229*** 0.039***  -0.589*** 0.042*** 
 0.158*** 0.084***  0.093*** 0.001*** 
  (19.70)    (42.19)     (9.97)    (25.52)     (-19.94)    (34.09)    
 (19.13)    (43.60)     (8.96)    (4.26)    
GDP  0.014*** 0.013***  0.069*** 0.009***  -0.047*** 0.005*** 
 -0.010*** 0.010***  0.006*   0.001*** 
  (5.09)    (19.15)     (8.84)    (18.44)     (-8.21)    (13.25)    
 (-6.79)    (15.26)     (1.77)    (8.16)    
MCAP  -0.067*** -0.016***  -0.043*** -0.004***  0.150*** -0.010*** 
 -0.033*** -0.016***  -0.039*** -0.001*** 
  (-23.00)    (-64.36)     (-14.63)    (-21.43)     (24.06)    (-68.83)    






       
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of Firms  14,526  14,526   14,526  14,526   14,526  14,526   14,526  14,526   14,526  14,526  





Table 11 Institutional ownership and firm value: three-stage least squares regression and detailed breakdown 
 This table presents the estimates of coefficients of simultaneous regressions of firm performance (Tobin’s Q) for non-U.S. firms as broken down by each 
type of institution. The dependent variable is log(Q).  The result in Panel A examines mutual fund ownership (IO_MUTUAL), in Panel B investment advisor 
ownership (IO_INVEST), in Panel C hedge fund ownership (IO_HEDGE), in Panel D bank trusts (IO_BANK), in Panel E insurance companies (IO_INSURANCE), 
and in Panel F pension funds (IO_PENSION). The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016 with 
no missing variables. The regressions include year and industry fixed effects. All utility (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The 
robust t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. The variables (refer to data description section) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
    Panel A   Panel B   Panel C   Panel D   Panel E   Panel F 
Institution Type  Mutual Funds  Investment Advisors  Hedge Funds  Bank Trusts  Insurance Companies 
 Pension Funds 
Dependent Variable   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO   log(Q) IO  log(Q) IO 
                   
IO  42.944***   -36.194*** 
 
 20.558***   -1118.209***   36.862***   -59.111***  
  (20.74)      (-12.79)    
 
 (17.72)      (-24.34)      (2.86)      (-25.41)     
(IO)2  -62.142***   47.985*** 
 
 -34.224***   11108.901***   -170.308      206.490***  
  (-11.72)      (9.66)    
 
 (-13.43)      (19.20)      (-1.60)      (18.34)     
log(Q)  
 0.034***  
 -0.346***   -0.152*** 
  0.001***   0.004***   0.084*** 
  
 (2.70)     
 (-12.57)      (-17.29)    
  (3.16)      (3.97)      (15.01)    





  0.059***   0.065***   -0.178***  
  (11.92)    
 
 (-9.07)    
 
 (15.92)    
  (11.98)      (12.91)      (-12.67)     
SIZE  -0.011    0.006***  0.338*** 0.026***  0.134*** -0.000*** 
 0.065*** 0.000***  0.101*** -0.000***  0.107*** 0.004*** 
 
 (-0.88)    (65.07)     (18.57)    (122.14)     (23.22)    (-2.75)    
 (16.51)    (26.84)     (22.14)    (-3.32)     (16.77)    (99.64)    





  0.000      -0.005***   0.008***  
  (-10.21)    
 
 (4.22)    
 
 (-15.83)    
  (1.21)      (-9.77)      (11.61)     
BM  
 0.003     
 -0.076***   -0.041*** 
  0.000***   0.000      0.023*** 
  
 (0.97)     
 (-11.71)      (-19.70)    
  (6.35)      (0.13)      (17.23)    
INVOP  0.063*** -0.002***  0.188*** 0.008***  0.133*** 0.001    
 0.128*** 0.000***  0.156*** -0.001***  0.059*** -0.001*** 
  (2.79)    (-2.80)     (5.88)    (5.05)     (18.38)    (1.49)    
 (19.24)    (6.19)     (44.31)    (-11.42)     (5.02)    (-3.01)    
RDK  -0.009    
 
 0.037**  
 
 0.043*** 
  0.070***   0.066***   0.115***  
  (-0.76)    
 
 (1.99)    
 
 (8.94)    
  (18.61)      (31.53)      (17.67)     
RDUM  -0.002    
 
 -0.024*   
 
 -0.018*** 
  -0.013***   -0.018***   -0.020***  
  (-0.27)    
 
 (-1.84)    
 
 (-5.76)    
  (-4.82)     
 (-11.07)      (-4.36)     
RET  
 -0.000***  
 -0.002***   0.000*** 
  -0.000*     -0.000***   -0.000*** 
  
 (-2.97)     
 (-6.94)      (3.38)    
  (-1.65)      (-3.70)      (-6.64)    
TURN  
 0.001***  
 0.005***   0.001*** 
  0.000      -0.000      0.000*** 
  
 (7.92)     
 (24.48)      (16.91)    
  (1.30)      (-1.61)      (3.74)    
DY  
 0.011**   
 0.009      -0.050*** 
  0.000      0.001      0.023*** 
  
 (2.01)     
 (0.67)      (-11.53)    
  (0.25)      (1.40)      (8.74)    
ROE  
 -0.000     
 0.010***   0.002*** 
  -0.000***   -0.000***   -0.004*** 
  
 (-0.81)     
 (8.68)      (6.22)    
  (-5.37)      (-2.97)      (-15.60)    
MSCI  
 0.002**   
 0.007***   0.001    
  0.000***   0.000**    0.002*** 
  
 (2.42)     
 (4.42)      (1.49)    
  (6.26)      (2.50)      (5.31)    
LEV  0.636*** -0.018***  -0.209*** -0.050***  0.302*** -0.033*** 
 0.002    0.000**   0.091*** -0.001***  0.043*** 0.008*** 
  (20.82)    (-13.69)     (-5.79)    (-16.68)     (22.57)    (-34.82)    
 (0.31)    (2.48)     (20.12)    (-4.86)     (3.57)    (12.63)    
CASH  0.602*** -0.016***  0.777*** 0.024***  0.224*** 0.002**  
 0.158*** 0.000***  0.268*** -0.002***  -0.341*** -0.008*** 
  (7.91)    (-11.92)     (6.71)    (8.04)     (8.41)    (2.54)    
 (6.57)    (4.40)     (20.63)    (-15.73)     (-7.86)    (-13.73)    
(CASH)2  -0.042    
 
 -0.809***   0.272***  
 0.248***   0.162***   0.730***  
  (-0.37)    
 
 (-4.50)      (6.69)     
 (6.76)      (8.03)      (11.61)     
ADR  0.001    -0.001     0.293*** 0.014***  -0.043*** 0.002*** 
 0.051*** 0.000***  0.006    0.000*    -0.042*** -0.001*** 
  (0.03)    (-0.77)     (7.64)    (8.35)     (-5.05)    (3.66)    
 (6.72)    (4.33)     (1.40)    (1.67)     (-3.30)    (-2.71)    
72 
 





  0.199***   0.217***   0.195***  
  (2.00)    
 
 (8.00)    
 
 (21.00)    
  (22.87)      (44.14)      (13.59)     
LEGAL  -0.017*** 0.000***  0.013*** 0.001***  -0.000    -0.000*   
 0.002*** 0.000***  0.003*** -0.000***  0.002*** 0.000*** 
  (-16.99)    (21.94)     (12.23)    (18.55)     (-0.19)    (-1.91)    
 (11.65)    (5.41)     (5.99)    (-33.14)     (6.63)    (3.61)    
DISC  -0.096*** 0.004***  0.390*** 0.016***  0.043*** -0.002*** 
 0.033*** 0.000***  0.035*** -0.000***  0.211*** 0.007*** 
  (-8.73)    (11.67)     (14.23)    (21.07)     (12.50)    (-7.87)    
 (10.64)    (6.07)     (15.11)    (-8.44)     (29.40)    (44.81)    
DISTANCE  0.946*** -0.033***  -2.324*** -0.137***  0.090*** -0.011*** 
 -0.127*** -0.000***  -0.057*** -0.001***  -0.417*** -0.012*** 
  (24.73)    (-56.48)     (-21.00)    (-106.34)     (9.03)    (-27.58)    
 (-21.87)    (-13.02)     (-6.07)    (-13.79)     (-30.59)    (-44.10)    
ENGLISH  -0.481*** 0.016***  0.719*** 0.050***  -0.053*** 0.009*** 
 0.045*** 0.000**   -0.010    0.001***  0.020**  -0.000    
  (-18.39)    (25.42)     (17.84)    (37.10)     (-7.35)    (19.76)    
 (7.98)    (2.46)     (-0.69)    (26.16)     (2.12)    (-0.83)    
GDP  0.231*** -0.006***  0.345*** 0.019***  -0.058*** 0.002*** 
 -0.026*** -0.000***  -0.025*** 0.000     0.012*** 0.001*** 
  (17.36)    (-28.47)     (15.67)    (41.44)     (-23.49)    (17.17)    
 (-13.78)    (-3.98)     (-16.42)    (0.30)     (3.33)    (9.26)    
MCAP  0.082*** -0.003***  -0.163*** -0.010***  0.001    -0.001*** 
 -0.014*** -0.000***  -0.008*** 0.000     -0.037*** -0.001*** 
  (21.88)    (-38.42)     (-21.81)    (-59.97)     (1.41)    (-11.53)    






          
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes 
Number of Firms         14,526      14,526          14,526  14,526          14,526       14,526               14,526       14,526         14,526       14,526   14,526  14,526  
N         78,547      78,547          78,547  78,547          78,547       78,547               78,547       78,547         78,547       78,547  
 78,547  78,547  
 
 
